Social influence and social learning in young children and infants by Over, Harriet
Social Influence and Social Learning in Young Children
and Infants |
Harriet Over
Thesis submitted to 
Cardiff University  
For the degree of 
Doctor o f  Philosophy  
September 2009
UMI Number: U585255
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U585255
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
DECLARATION
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not 
concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.
(candidate)Signed 
D ate .........
STATEMENT 1
This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 .....................(insert MCh, MD, MPhil, PhD etc, as appropriate)
Signed    (candidate)
Date....„>2 7 ..l0 ./.£ 3 ........
STATEMENT 2
This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where 
otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references.
Signed ..  (candidate)
D a te  VL/.L0J.P1\.........
STATEMENT 3
1 hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for 
inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside 
organisations.
Signed .. ..................... (candidate)
Date \Z ,Y A b ^ .6 f l ..........
Acknowledgements
This thesis was undertaken in the School of Psychology at Cardiff University and in the
Department for Developmental and Comparative Psychology at the Max Planck Institute
for Evolutionary Anthropology in Leipzig. It was funded by a combination of an ESRC
!
1+3 Studentship and a Leverhulme Trust Study Abroad Studentship.
I would like to thank my supervisors Malinda Carpenter, Merideth Gattis and Russell 
Spears for their continuous guidance and support throughout this PhD. In addition, I 
would like to thank Josep Call, Ulrike Hahn, Rob Honey and Michael Tomasello for their 
valuable advice at various stages of the project. I would also like to express my gratitude 
towards the First Steps team in Cardiff and the Social Cognition Group in Leipzig for 
their support and for their helpful comments on my research.
Further, I would like to thank Henriette Zeidler in Leipzig and Lesley-Anne Strabel and 
Nathalie Walters in Cardiff for help with the many administrative issues which arose 
during my PhD. I would also like to thank Dave Miller and Kevin Hotson in Cardiff, and 
Petra Jahn in Leipzig, for their assistance with technical issues.
I am indebted to Liane Jorschick, Elena Rossi, and Alice Winstanley for help with testing 
and to Kristine Altrichter, Eike Graefenhain, James Harris, and Jana Rahmlow for help 
with coding.
I am also indebted to Techniquest Science Discovery Centre and to the schools and 
nurseries in Cardiff and Leipzig who allowed me to test on their premises. Further, to the 
many parents and children who participated in my studies; without them this research 
would not have been possible.
On a personal note, I would like to offer my deepest thanks to my parents, and my partner 
James, for their love and support throughout the course of this PhD and for their many 
insightful comments into my research.
I
This thesis is based on the follow ing publications:
Over, H., & Carpenter, M. (in press). Eighteen-month-old infants show increased helping 
following priming with affiliation. Psychological Science.
Over, H., & Carpenter, M. (2009). Priming third-party ostracism increases affiliative
i
imitation in children. Developmental Science, 12 (3), F1-F8.
Over, H., & Gattis, M. (in press). Verbal imitation is based on intention 
understanding. Cognitive Development.
I
Thesis Summary /
This thesis examines the motivations underlying social influence and behaviour matching 
in young children. In my General Introduction, I argue that, in adults, behaviour matching 
is often motivated by goals to learn from and affiliate with other group members (or by a 
combination of these two factors). In addition to explicit forms o f behaviour matching, 
however, adults also subconsciously assimilate their behaviour to those around them. I
j
argue that imitation in young children may be similarly motivated by goals to leam from 
and affiliate with others. In other words, that imitation performs an instrumental and a 
social function in development. Further, I argue that young children may also 
subconsciously assimilate their behaviour to those around them. The following 
experimental chapters test aspects of these claims. Chapter 2 investigates verbal 
imitation. Focusing on the instrumental aspects of this ability, I test whether young 
children copy the perceived intentions behind speech. Results show that children correct 
the ungrammatical utterances of an intentional model, but copy the utterances of a non- 
intentional model exactly. Chapter 3 investigates social imitation. In that chapter, I test 
whether children increase their imitation when they have a goal to affiliate. Results show 
that children who have been given a goal to affiliate (through priming with social 
exclusion) copy the actions of a model significantly more closely than children who have 
been given a neutral prime. Chapter 4 investigates unintentional, or subconscious, 
behaviour matching and tests whether even infants assimilate their behaviour to social 
primes. Results show that infants primed with affiliation are significantly more likely to 
help an experimenter than infants primed with individuality. Taken together, these 
experiments demonstrate that behaviour matching is a diverse and important phenomenon 
in development. It occurs both intentionally and unintentionally, and enables children to 
leam from and affiliate with those around them.
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Human beings are intensely social creatures, spending many hours each day 
engaged in social interaction. In each interaction we engage in, we influence and are 
influenced by our social partners. Consequently, many of our thoughts, judgments and 
actions are strongly dependent on what our group members think and do (Forgas & 
Williams, 2001). As adults, we adopt the innovations produced by those around us 
(Goldstone, Roberts, & Gureckis, 2008), conform to the opinions and values of our group 
members (Asch, 1955), accept the attitudes of perceived experts (Petty & Cacioppo,
1984) and obey the commands of authority figures (Milgram, 1974). So susceptible are 
we to social influence, that we do not even need to interact with our group members in 
order to be influenced by them: their implied presence is sufficient to alter our social 
behaviour (e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Garcia, Waever, Moskowitz, & Darley, 
2002). Social influence is thus a huge area and has been studied extensively in adults 
and, to a lesser extent, in children (e.g., Aboud, 2003; Corriveau & Harris, 2009; Walker 
& Andrade, 1996).
Despite this, one area has remained curiously detached from the field of social 
influence, and that is social learning and, in particular, imitation. As adults, we are 
prolific imitators: we copy our group members in order to leam new skills from them and 
in the hope of being accepted by them and fitting in (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). So deep 
is our tendency to match the behaviour of others that we even do it subconsciously;
1
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automatically mimicking the gestures, mannerisms, and even accents of our group 
members (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009). Infants and young 
children are also prolific imitators (Tomasello, 1999), copying others’ instrumental and 
social behaviours from early in development (e.g., Kuczynski, Zahn-Waxler, & Radke-
Yarrow, 1987). While adults’ tendency to match the behaviour of others has been
[
discussed in terms of social influence (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2001), such a focus has rarely 
been applied to the developmental study of imitation.
In this thesis, I attempt to apply some insights from the field of social influence to 
the developmental study o f behaviour matching. In this review chapter, I outline 
traditional social influence research and describe the classic distinction between 
informational and normative social influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). The following 
sections discuss the extent to which instrumental and social imitation in young children 
and infants can be seen as analogous to these two forms of influence. Following on from 
this discussion. Chapter 2 investigates the instrumental function of imitation and Chapter 
3 investigates the social function of imitation. In the later sections of this review, I 
broaden my focus and discuss forms of social influence and behaviour matching which 
occur without the formation of explicit intentions, more specifically, mimicry and social 
priming. These themes are further developed in Chapter 4. In that chapter, I investigate 
the influence o f social priming on infant behaviour.
1.1,1 Social influence
Broadly speaking, social influence is the study of how our actions, thoughts and 
judgments are affected by those around us. Although some researchers adopt more
2
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stringent definitions (e.g., Turner, 1991), others are content with a very general definition / 
(e.g., Forgas & Williams, 2001; Dijksterhuis, 2001). Traditionally, however, research on 
social influence has focused on a number of key topics such as conformity, persuasion, 
compliance and obedience (Forgas & Williams, 2001).
A great deal of research has focused on the goals and intentions which underlie
i
responses to social influence attempts. Cialdini and Trost (1998) have argued that the 
recipients of social influence processes such as compliance and conformity are motivated 
by a relatively small number of goals. Individuals may adopt the behaviour of their 
group members because they desire to act effectively, because they desire to build and 
maintain positive social relationships or because they seek to maintain a positive self- 
concept. This conceptualisation is closely related to Fiske’s core motive approach. Fiske 
(2004) claims that there are five core motives underlying social influence (and indeed 
social behaviour more generally). The root motive among these is the need to belong and 
be accepted by other group members. The remaining four motives, the need to 
understand, the need to feel in control, the need to enhance the self and the need to 
believe in a benevolent world, are all derived from this basic desire.
Perhaps the best known conceptualisation of the motives underlying responses to 
social influence, however, was provided by Deutsch and Gerard (1955). The authors 
identified two forms of social influence: informational influence and normative influence. 
Informational influence occurs when we accept information obtained from another 
because we believe it to be evidence about reality (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). It is often 
referred to as ‘true influence' because it leads to private acceptance, internalisation and 
attitude change (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). The most famous experimental example of
3
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informational influence is Sherifs (1936) autokinetic study. In this experiment, Sherif 
placed a group of individuals in a darkened room in which a single light beam was 
directed at one of the walls. Although the light was stationary, the situation created a 
visual illusion such that it appeared to be moving. When asked to rate the extent of the
movement in the light, participants tended to conform to the judgments of the other>
I
individuals in the room, presumably because they were personally uncertain of the 
correct answer and the group provided the only other source of information available.
Normative influence occurs when we accept information from others in order to 
conform to their positive expectations. It is motivated by the need for social approval and 
the desire to avoid rejection (Deutsch & Gerard, 1951). The exact nature of this form of 
influence is, however, controversial. For Turner (1991) (and other researchers working 
within a self categorisation perspective) normative influence is conceptualised as a power 
process: individuals respond to social pressure in order to avoid punishment from other 
group members. For other researchers, however, normative influence is conceptualised 
as a form of affiliation (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004): individuals seek to build and 
maintain social bonds through matching their behaviour to that of others (Cialdini & 
Trost, 1998). The classic experimental example of normative influence is Asch’s (1955) 
conformity paradigm. Asch (1955) placed a single participant in a room with seven 
confederates. The eight individuals were asked to perform a simple perceptual task; 
judging which of three lines was the longest. On the critical test trials, the seven 
confederates unanimously chose one of the incorrect lines. Participants conformed to the 
majority's opinion approximately 30% of the time, even though they never performed 
incorrectly when asked to make the judgment on their own. Further support for the claim
4
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that this behaviour represents a form of normative influence was provided by Deutsch 
and Gerard (1955) who demonstrated that participants within the Asch paradigm are 
more likely to conform when their answers are given in public, and when they are made 
to feel that they and the confederates form a group.
Although the distinction between normative and informational influence was
/’
developed in the context of research on conformity, variants of this model have ' 
subsequently been applied to many other areas of social influence including norm-based 
behaviour (Cialdini, 2003) and persuasion (Eagly & Chaiken 1984; Petty & Cacioppo,
1986). Thus we can think of informational influence, more generally, as a desire to use 
information from other group members in order to reach accurate decisions about the 
external world. Normative influence can also be thought of more generally, as 
behavioural change motivated by a desire to be accepted and liked by group members.
1.1.2 Behaviour matching and imitation
This review is concerned with a particular form of social influence: behaviour 
matching. Before going any further, it is necessary to justify my use of this term, rather 
than the more standard ‘imitation’. My use of the term ‘behaviour matching’ reflects two 
motivations. First, it allows me to sidestep (to some extent at least), the debate about 
what counts as ‘genuine’ imitation. Different forms of social learning have proved 
notoriously difficult to define, and imitation is no exception. For some researchers, 
imitation merely involves reproducing actions after watching them done (Nielsen, in 
press), for others it involves learning novel actions (Thorpe, 1963), and for others still it 
involves reproducing actions in terms of their goals and intentions (Tomasello, 1999;
5
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Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). The term ‘behaviour matching’ is 
useful in this context because it enables me to discuss different forms of social learning 
(and imitation) under the general framework of social influence, whilst retaining the 
option of using more specific terms when necessary.
Second, my use o f this term reflects the breadth of the perspective I seek to take.
i
Call and Carpenter (2002) (see also Carpenter & Call, 2002; Carpenter & Call, in press) 
attempted to clarify the definition of imitation, and other social learning processes, by 
outlining three elements which could be copied from a demonstration. Call and 
Carpenter argued that, from watching a demonstration, an individual could leam about 
the results that demonstration produced on the environment, the actions used to produce 
those results and/or the goals underlying those actions. These distinctions have proved 
very useful in distinguishing different cases of social learning (see, for example, Call, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005). However, when considering social influence more 
generally, it is useful to adopt a broader perspective. Within complex social behaviour 
there are many more elements of a model’s behaviour which may be copied: in addition 
to copying a model’s goals, for example, an individual may adopt their opinions, 
attitudes, character traits and even beliefs. Following Dijksterhuis (2001), I intend the 
term behaviour matching to include these more abstract forms of copying, as well as the 
more standard copying of actions and goals.
1.1.3 Social goals in behaviour matching
As outlined above, social influence researchers have devoted considerable time 
and energy to investigating the goals which underlie behaviour matching. This situation
6
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is in notable contrast to developmental research on social learning which,tias shown a 
relative neglect of the social goals which underlie imitation (Nielsen, in press). In the 
following sections, I will attempt to compensate for this neglect by discussing whether 
different forms of imitation in development can be thought of as analogous to 
informational and normative social influence. i
(
Almost 30 years ago, Uzgiris (1981, 1984) made a distinction between two forms 
of imitation in development. Uzgiris (1981) argued that when a child copies an action 
they may have either instrumental goals -  to leam about the objects and actions involved 
in the demonstration or social goals -  to affiliate, or affirm a shared state with a model.
In defining these two forms of imitation, Uzgiris (1981) drew on the distinction between 
informational and normative influence. Uzgiris argued that when a child copies a model 
in order to find a correct solution to a problem, their behaviour may be analogous to 
informational influence. When a child copies a model's action because they are socially 
‘attracted' to them, their behaviour may be analogous to normative influence. (Thus for 
Uzgiris (1981), as well as for Cialdini (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Cialdini & Trost, 
1998), normative influence is closely related to affiliation). In this review, I expand on 
Uzgiris' comparison. In order to ascertain the validity of the analogy between 
informational and normative influence and instrumental and social imitation, I outline a 
set of criteria for informational and normative influence and assess the extent to which 
children’s imitation adheres to these criteria.
7
/1.2 Is instrumental imitation analogous to informational influence?
Although many different social learning processes (including low level processes 
such as stimulus enhancement and response facilitation) can be thought of as basic forms 
of informational influence, the traditional definition of this form of influence involves the
attainment of specific criteria (see Turner, 1991):
i
• The stimulus must be objectively ambiguous or hard to understand, making it 
difficult to find an individual solution to the problem at hand.
• The resulting uncertainty leads individuals to seek a social solution to their 
problem. The individual looks to others for valid information about reality.
• The result is ‘true’ influence; the individual adopts the solutions of those around 
them. The knowledge the individual acquires can be used immediately or at a 
later date.
• Models are believed to the extent that they appear to be reliable, trustworthy and 
experts within a particular domain.
Implicit within these criteria for informational influence is another requirement: in 
order to fulfill the above criteria, an individual must be able to understand those around 
them in terms of their goals and intentions. Although more basic forms of influence can 
occur without intention understanding, this is not true for the case outlined above. In 
order for this form of informational influence to occur, an individual must recognise that 
their own strategy is inadequate to achieve their goal. Following this realisation, they 
must analyse whether those around them have the same goal. Only then can they make a 
decision about whether to copy their strategy. Although it might be possible to take
8
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intention understanding for granted in adults, the same is not tjru e for young children and 
infants.
Below I discuss whether young children and infants understand others as 
intentional agents like the self and whether they use this understanding in order to 
imitatively leam novel acts. The subsequent questions, whether children are more likely
I
to imitate when a stimulus is difficult to understand, whether children internalise 
solutions learned by imitation and whether they are sensitive to reliability and expertise 
when deciding who to leam from, are beyond the scope of this thesis but, as they are 
critical to the general argument, will be discussed very briefly following the discussion of 
intention-based imitation.
1,2.1 Are young children and infants able to understand others in terms o f their goals 
and intentions?
In adults, informational influence is possible because we understand others as 
intentional agents like the self. In this section, I discuss whether the same is true for 
young children and infants. Classic research into intention understanding used verbal 
techniques in order to probe the extent of children’s understanding. For example, Piaget 
(1932) showed children picture books in which an actor either caused harm accidentally 
or on purpose. In one scenario, a little boy helped his mother wash up and inadvertently 
broke several plates. In the other scenario, the little boy deliberately smashed a single 
plate whilst stealing a cookie. Whereas 7-year-old children tended to attribute the most 
blame to the boy who caused the most harm, 9-year-old children attributed greater blame 
to the boy with malicious intent. In a similar vein, Baird and Moses (2001) presented 4-
9
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1 and 5-year-old children with stories in which two characters performed the same action 
but with different intentions. For example, both characters were shown running but one 
did so in order to reach their destination quickly and the other did so in order to keep fit. 
Whereas 5-year-olds were able to attribute different intentions to the same action, 4-year- 
olds were not. Baird and Moses (2001) interpret this as evidence that 4-year-olds have 
difficulty separating internally represented intentions from actions.
Non-verbal techniques, however, suggest that intention understanding emerges 
considerably earlier. Woodward (1998), for example, has suggested that the basics 
needed for later intention-understanding emerge as early as 6 months. In one study, 
Woodward habituated infants to a scene in which an arm repeatedly reached for one of 
two objects (a teddy bear or a ball) on a small stage. At test, the locations of the two 
objects were switched and the hand either reached towards the same location or towards 
the same object. Results showed that infants looked longer (and so were presumably 
more surprised) when the arm reached towards the novel object than when it reached 
towards the novel location. One interpretation of these results is that infants had encoded 
the goal of the actor’s reach and were surprised when this goal changed, but there is an 
alternative, more parsimonious account of these data: it is possible that, rather than 
encoding the goal of the action, infants had encoded the object of the actor’s reach. They 
were surprised when the arm reached towards the novel toy because they expected the 
actor to be consistent in their interaction with the test objects (Tomasello et al., 2005).
Although the Woodward study is suggestive, it is not conclusive. There is, 
however, converging evidence that infants understand goals and intentions by 9 months 
(Tomasello, 1999). Baldwin, Baird, Saylor and Clark (2001) used a looking time
10
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paradigm to measure whether infants parse dynamic action into discrete goals. Baldwin 
et al. familiarised 10-month-olds with video clips in which a woman performed a series 
of actions, for example, picking up a towel from the floor and placing it on a towel rail. 
At test, Baldwin et al. introduced a series of pauses into the videos. In one condition, the
videos were paused at the end of each goal-directed action, for example, immediately
I
after the woman grasped the towel. In the other condition, the videos were paused such 
that they interrupted goal-directed actions, for example, as the woman was moving 
towards the towel rail. Infants showed renewed interest in the videos which had been 
paused in the midst of goal-directed action, but remained habituated to the videos which 
were paused at the completion of goal-directed actions. This can be interpreted as 
evidence that infants, like adults, parse actions into chunks corresponding to the 
fulfilment o f an actor's goals. However, as Baldwin et al. point out, it is also possible 
that infants were demonstrating sensitivity to the statistical regularities in the 
environment without necessarily inferring the intentions behind them.
Further evidence that infants around this age understand goals and intentions has 
been provided by Gergely and Csibra (2003; see also Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 
1995). Gergely and Csibra (2003) habituated infants to a scene in which a small circle 
moved across the screen towards a larger circle, jumping a barrier in order to do so. At 
test, the barrier was removed and the small circle either continued to make the same 
jumping movement as before or moved in a straight line towards the larger circle. In 
intentional terms, the jumping movement became inexplicable once the barrier was 
removed; were the small circle an intentional agent it should take the most rational path 
towards its goal. Results suggested that infants interpreted the actions in just these terms:
11
/infants showed renewed interest in the scene where the small circle continued to make the 
same jumping movement as before. Although many have interpreted this as evidence 
that infants understand others’ goals (e.g., Tomasello et al., 2005), Gergely and Csibra 
themselves have a lower level explanation: infants were adopting a teleological 
interpretation of the scene. Based on an analogy to Dennett's (1987) design stance,
(
Gergely and Csibra argue that infants interpret actions not in terms of internal goals, but 
in terms of the endstates they are designed to achieve.
Behne, Carpenter, Call and Tomasello (2005) have provided convincing 
behavioural evidence that infants understand intentional action by 9 months. Behne et al. 
presented infants with a model who was either unwilling to give them a toy (e.g., because 
she wanted to play with it herself) or unable to do so (e.g., because she accidentally 
dropped it). Results showed that 9-month-olds, but not 6-month-olds, were significantly 
more impatient when the experimenter was unwilling to give them the toy than when she 
was unable to do so. This held true even though, on test trials, infants were never given 
the toys themselves. Thus, there is accumulating evidence that infants understand goals 
by 9 months. In the following section, I discuss whether this understanding impacts upon 
children’s imitative behaviour.
1.2.2 Is instrumental imitation based on intention understanding?
The definition of informational influence outlined above implies that it is a 
cognitively sophisticated process in which an actor analyses the goals of a model within a 
particular situation and uses similar actions when they themselves have the same goal.
Intention understanding is thus important for informational influence for two reasons.
12
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First, it is helpful in order to decide whp to copy within a given situation: if an individual 
seeks a solution to an instrumental problem, then it is important to copy someone who 
has a similar goal as themselves. Second, it is important in order to decide what to copy 
from within a demonstration: intention understanding allows an individual to filter out
irrelevant behaviours as well accidents and mistakes. It follows, that in order to
I
determine whether the analogy between informational influence and instrumental 
imitation is valid, it is necessary to ascertain whether imitation is (at least at times) based 
on intention understanding.
There is now a considerable body of research suggesting that infants and young 
children copy the actions of others based on an understanding of their goals and 
intentions (e.g., Carpenter, Ahktar, & Tomasello, 1998; Meltzoff, 1995). In one 
demonstration of this. Carpenter et al. (1998) presented infants with a demonstration in 
which a model performed two very similar actions. The model marked one of these 
actions as intentional by saying ‘There!’ as she performed it and marked the other as 
accidental, by saying ‘Whoops!’ as she performed it. Results showed that infants copied 
the actions marked as intentional more often than those marked as accidental.
In similar work, Bekkering, Wohlschlager and Gattis (2000) showed that 3- to 6- 
year-old children will copy exactly the same action differently depending on its perceived 
goal. Bekkering et al. presented children with one of two demonstrations. In one 
condition, a model placed her hand on one of two dots painted on a table. In the other 
condition, the model placed her hand on the same location in space, but there were no 
dots present. When asked to imitate, children in the ‘dot’ condition tended to touch the 
same dot as the experimenter, but made errors in which hand they used to do so.
13
I
Children in the ‘no dot’ condition, on the other hand, tended to match the experimenter’s / 
actions exactly; using the same hand as she had done. Bekkering et al. interpreted this as 
evidence that actions are hierarchically organised (containing multiple goals) and that the 
children choose to reproduce only those goals they consider to be most important.
Carpenter, Call, and Tomasello (2005) found an analogous pattern of results with 12- and
i
18-month-old infants. *
Further evidence suggests that infants understand the rationality behind goal- 
directed actions (Gergely, Bekkering, & Kiraly, 2002). Gergely et al. presented 14- 
month-old infants with a demonstration in which an experimenter performed an unusual 
action in order to operate a light box: bending at the waist to turn on the light with her 
head. When the model chose this action freely, infants tended to copy it exactly (see also 
Meltzoff, 1988). However, when the model’s hands were constrained by a blanket which 
she held around herself as though she were cold, infants tended to turn on the light using 
their hands. Presumably infants in the latter condition inferred that the model would have 
used her hands to turn on the light had they been available. As this constraint did not 
apply to them, they adopted the most rational means to achieve the same goal of turning 
on the light.
Carpenter, Call and Tomasello (2002) have provided evidence that children use 
their understanding of more complex prior intentions, as well as intentions-in-action, in 
order to imitatively learn novel acts. Carpenter et al. (2002) presented 2-year-old 
children with a demonstration of how to open a box, by first removing a pin, and then 
opening the lid. Whereas some children saw this demonstration alone, other children 
were given information about the model’s prior intention before observing the
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demonstration. For example! children in one condition observed a model successfully 
open three other boxes before approaching the target box. Children who saw the 
demonstration on the target box alone performed poorly when offered the opportunity to 
open the box themselves. Children who had knowledge of the model’s prior intention,
however, were able to successfully open the box, even though they had had exactly the
/
same exposure to the target box itself.
Although many are now convinced by the intention-based account of imitation, 
others have argued that such a rich interpretation of these data is unwarranted. Heyes 
(2001), for example has argued that a great deal of imitation can be explained by low 
level associative processes. According to the Associative Sequence Learning model, 
imitation is based on a series of excitatory vertical links between sensory and motor 
representations. These links are generated through concurrent observation and execution 
of the same actions (Bird & Heyes, 2005). This account is compatible with evidence 
suggesting that non-human animals can be trained to imitate (Heyes, 2001). Custance, 
Whiten and Bard (1995), for example, taught two chimpanzees to imitate novel arbitrary 
gestures using a ‘Do this!' procedure. The two chimpanzees were first trained to imitate 
48 actions on command. Subsequent to this training, one subject was able to 
spontaneously copy 17 novel gestures, and the other 13 novel gestures.
Although the Associative Sequence Learning model does not explicitly deny that 
intention understanding may play a role in guiding behaviour (imitative or otherwise), 
Heyes and colleagues do question whether existing imitation studies are best explained 
by an intention-based account. For example, Heyes (2001) criticises Carpenter et al.
(1998) for confounding intention understanding with previous training. Heyes (2001)
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argues that, although adults understand the words ‘Whoops!’ and ‘There!’ as indicating 
accidental and intentional actions, it is not clear that infants understand them in the same 
way. It is equally possible, according to Heyes, that before infants understand intentions 
they recognise that reproducing actions previously associated with the word ‘There!’ is 
more likely to have rewarding consequences than reproducing actions previously
I
associated with the word ‘Whoops!’. Moreover, Bird, Brindley, Leighton and Heyes
(2007) have argued that the results of Bekkering et al. (2000) can be more 
parsimoniously explained in terms of perceptual salience: rather than copying the goals 
behind the actions, children were copying those actions which were perceptually easiest 
to discriminate. Thus, although there is a considerable body of evidence suggesting that 
infants and young children understand goals and intentions and use this understanding in 
order to imitatively learn novel acts, this claim remains controversial, with some 
researchers arguing that intention understanding does not play an integral role in 
imitation. Chapter 2 seeks to shed fresh light on this question by moving away from the 
traditional focus on action imitation and developing a verbal paradigm. This verbal 
paradigm avoids many of the confounds which have been previously highlighted by 
researchers within the associationist tradition.
1.2.3 Are children more likely to imitate when a stimulus is objectively ambiguous or 
difficult to understand?
According to the criteria outlined above, informational influence occurs when a 
problem is objectively difficult to understand. Thus children should be more likely to 
imitate when a problem is (or appears to be) hard to solve alone. This proposal will not
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be discussed in de/tail here, but it is worth noting that Williamson, Meltzoff, and 
Markman (2008) have provided evidence in favour of this particular claim. Williamson 
et al. (2008) randomly assigned three-year-olds to have either an easy or a difficult 
experience achieving a goal. Whereas children in the easy prior experience condition 
were able to successfully open the top drawer of a cabinet, children in the difficult prior
i
experience condition were unable to open the drawer, as it was jammed. Children in both 
conditions were then given a demonstration in which a model used a distinctive action 
style in order to open another drawer. Children who had been led to believe that the task 
was difficult to solve alone were more likely to copy the distinctive action style used by 
the model. Presumably children in this task used imitation in an attempt to find an 
optimal solution to the problem at hand.
1.2.4 Do children internalise (and later reproduce) instrumental solutions learned by 
imitation?
Informational influence is often referred to as ‘true influence’ in that it leads to 
genuine behavioural (and/or attitudinal) change (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). That is to 
say, individuals internalise the solutions to problems and can then apply these solutions at 
different times and in different contexts. Once again, this claim will not be discussed in 
detail here, but it is nonetheless important to note that infants also internalise the 
solutions to problems and apply them at later times and within different contexts in a 
phenomenon known as ‘deferred imitation’. Meltzoff (1985) measured 14-month-old 
infants’ ability to reproduce an instrumental action after a 24-hour delay. Infants in the 
experimental condition were presented with a demonstration of how to pull a toy
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dumbbell apart, whereas infants in the control condition were shown jm  irrelevant action 
on the same toy. Infants’ ability to solve the problem was assessed the next day.
Whereas 70% of infants in the experimental condition successfully pulled the toy apart, 
only 25% of infants in the control condition did likewise. Herbert, Gross and Hayne
(2006) demonstrated deferred imitation after a 24-hour delay in 9-month-olds using a
/
very similar paradigm; 6-month-olds, however, were not able to solve the problem after 
the delay. Klein and Meltzoff (1999) investigated retention after longer intervals and 
showed that 12-month-olds are able to reproduce an observed act even after a delay of 
four weeks.
In related research, Chen, Sanchez and Campbell (1997) have demonstrated that 
infants are able to apply solutions learned via imitation to novel contexts. Chen et al. 
(1997) presented 10- and 13-month-old infants with a problem which required two 
actions to reach a solution (pulling a cloth in order to acquire a string, which would 
enable them to drag a toy within reach). After observing the model perform these 
actions, the 13-month-olds were able to transfer the solution to superficially dissimilar 
(although structurally isomorphic) problems. Ten-month-olds were also able to transfer 
the novel solution, but only if there was high perceptual similarity between the modelled 
solution and the problem they were presented with.
1.2.5 Do children modify their behaviour depending on the trustworthiness o f a model?
According to the criteria for informational influence outlined above, not all 
models are equally influential: they are believed to the extent that they appear to be 
reliable, trustworthy and experts within a particular domain. Recently there has been a
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great deal of research demonstrating that children also monitor expertise and reliability. 
Below, I briefly discuss some of the key findings.
Moore, Bryant and Furrow (1989) presented evidence that preschool children 
make inferences about expertise when deciding who to trust. Four-year-old children
were more likely to search in the location suggested by an experimenter who indicated
I
confidence in their claim, by saying ‘I know it’s in the blue box’, than in the location 
suggested by an experimenter who indicated their uncertainty, by saying ‘I think it’s in 
the red box’.
Related research has shown that young children also monitor reliability when 
deciding who to trust (e.g. Clement, Koenig & Harris, 2004; Corriveau, Pasquini & 
Harris. 2005; Koenig, Clement & Harris, 2004; Koenig & Harris, 2005). Koenig et al.
(2004), for example, presented 3- and 4-year-olds with two informants -  one who 
consistently labelled familiar objects correctly (e.g., labelling a ball a ball) and one who 
consistently labelled them incorrectly (e.g., labelling a ball a shoe). During the test 
phase, the informants provided different labels for a novel object. Children of both ages 
consistently endorsed the label offered by the previously reliable informant over the 
previously unreliable informant. Koenig and Harris (2005) have demonstrated that 
preschoolers use similar strategies when learning instrumental tasks. As in the 
experiment described above, Koenig and Harris (2005) presented 3- and 4-year-old 
children with two models; one who consistently labelled familiar objects correctly and 
one who consistently labelled them incorrectly. Subsequent to this familiarisation phase, 
the two models offered conflicting demonstrations of how to use a novel object. For 
example, whereas one model brought the object to her lips and blew it as though it were a
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recorder, the other model swept it along the top of the tabl£. Children were then asked to 
demonstrate the proper function of the object themselves. Results showed that both the 
3- and 4-year-old children tended to reproduce the demonstrations offered by the 
previously reliable model.
Recent research has suggested that 14-month-old infants also take reliability into
(
account when deciding who to imitate (Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2009). 
Zmyj et al. presented infants with a video demonstration in which a model consistently 
acted in a competent manner (for example, successfully putting shoes on his feet and 
gloves on his hands) or an incompetent manner (for example, putting shoes on his hands 
and gloves on his feet). Subsequent to this, the model demonstrated an instrumental 
action using an unusual style (e.g., turning on a light inside a box using his head). Infants 
were significantly more likely to copy the specific actions of the competent model than 
the incompetent model.
1.2.6 Summary
This section discussed whether instrumental imitation can be seen as analogous to 
informational influence. In order to do this, I outlined a set of criteria for the attainment 
of informational influence and analysed the extent to which instrumental imitation 
adhered to this criteria. During this discussion, I briefly touched on whether children are 
more likely to imitate when a stimulus is difficult to understand, whether they internalise 
solutions to instrumental problems and whether they monitor reliability when deciding 
who to copy. The main focus of this section, however, was on whether infants and young 
children understand others as intentional agents like the self, and whether they use this
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understanding to inform their imitation. I concluded that, although there is considerable 
evidence that infants and young children imitate the goals and intentions of others, this 
claim is controversial. Chapter 2 deals with this issue: in that chapter I outline a set of 
experiments designed to determine whether imitation (at least at times) is based on 
intention understanding. The first advantage of the verbal paradigm I develop in that 
chapter is methodological -  it avoids some of the pitfalls of previous research. The 
second advantage is theoretical: it extends the study of intention-based imitation into a 
new domain and investigates whether young children use an understanding of 
communicative intentions in order to decide what to copy.
1.3 Is social imitation analogous to normative influence?
Normative influence occurs when an individual is motivated to act in accord with 
the behaviour of their group members in order to fulfill social goals. As pointed out in 
the introduction, the exact nature of normative influence is controversial. Here, 
following Cialdini and Trost (1998) and Uzgiris (1981), I adopt the following criteria:
• It is motivated by a need to belong which creates a desire to adhere to the 
positive expectations of others (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Deutsch & Gerard, 
1955, Uzgiris, 1981).
• This leads individuals to match the behaviour of other group members in 
an attempt to ‘fit in’ and be accepted by them.
Thus in order to establish whether imitation in young children and infants is 
analogous to normative influence it is necessary to ascertain whether they possess a need 
to belong and a drive to affiliate. Following this, it is necessary to determine whether they
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understand the social goals and intentions of others (for example, whether they can 
recognise goals to affiliate and reject, and modify their social behaviour accordingly) and, 
finally, whether their imitative performance is influenced by affiliation goals.
1,3.1 Does the drive to affiliate influence behaviour in development?
I
As adults, we have a fundamental need to belong to the group (Baumeister & 
Leary, 1995). According to Baumeister and Leary, this need to belong has two key 
features. First, individuals need to believe that the social bonds they form are marked by 
stability and affective concern, and will continue for the foreseeable future. Second, 
individuals need to experience frequent and pleasant social interactions.
One indication of just how important belonging to a group is to us is that, as 
adults, we form social bonds very easily (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Tajfel (1970), for 
example, found that mere allocation to a group, even if that group is formed on the basis 
of seemingly meaningless criteria, is sufficient to lead participants to allocate rewards to 
ingroup members over outgroup members. Similarly, adults are reluctant to break social 
bonds once they have been formed (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Conformity research 
can be seen as indicative of this reluctance: once a group has been established, 
individuals are unwilling to question the opinions of their group members in case it 
threatens their membership of the group (Asch, 1955; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).
Another indication of just how important belonging is to us, is that we are 
incredibly sensitive to cues which indicate our exclusion from the group. For example, 
involvement in a relatively brief game in which two confederates neglect to throw a ball 
to an adult participant is sufficient to invoke feelings of sadness and exclusion (Williams
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& Sommer, 1997). The same effect holds when the other players are not even physically /
present: participants also feel sad when they are excluded from an online ball game 
(Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). In fact, a sense of ostracism can even be evoked 
without any interaction at all, through priming: participants who have been subliminally 
presented with words related to rejection (e.g., ignored, dumped, abandoned) during an
i
unrelated computer task appraise themselves more negatively than participants who have 
been subliminally presented with words related to acceptance (e.g., welcomed, attached, 
bonded) (Sommer & Baumeister, 2002).
Like adults, young children appear to form social bonds very easily. Spielman 
(2000), for example, found that mere allocation to a group is sufficient to produce 
ingroup bias in 6-year-olds. However, unlike adults, children only show this bias when 
competitively primed (Spielman, 2000). Furthermore, young children also seem reluctant 
to break bonds once they have been formed: three-year-olds show conformity within the 
Asch paradigm; at times accepting a majority's opinion even though they know it to be 
false (Corriveau & Harris, 2009; Walker & Andrade, 1996). Despite an increasing body 
of research on children's understanding of group membership, we know very little about 
how children react when their belongingness within a group is threatened. Chapter 3 
investigates this question. In that chapter, I test whether children modify their behaviour 
in response to subtle cues to social exclusion.
As adults, our need to belong generates a fundamental and pervasive drive to 
affiliate with our group members (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003; Schachter,
1959). Although very few studies have directly addressed affiliation in infancy, there is 
great deal of indirect evidence to suggest that infants engage in afflliative behaviours. I
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will discuss just a few examples her^. Human infants are social animals from soon after 
birth (Grossman & Johnson, 2007; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). From around 6 
weeks of age, infants begin to smile at human faces and engage in rhythmic interactions 
with others (Tomasello et al., 1993). Infants also show a primitive form of empathy from 
early in development, crying in response to hearing another baby cry (Sagi & Hoffman,
i
1976; Simner, 1971). Simner found that 2-day-old infants are more likely to cry in 
response to the sound of another baby crying than in response to a control sound of the 
same intensity.
Turning to older infants, it is possible to view declarative pointing as an affiliative 
behaviour. Liszkowski, Carpenter, Henning, Striano and Tomasello (2004) demonstrated 
that infants point declaratively in order to share experience with a social partner. 
Liszkowski et al. placed 12-month-olds in situations which were likely to elicit pointing 
gestures. Once an infant pointed, the experimenter would react in one of four different 
ways. In one condition, the experimenter reacted positively towards the target of the 
infants’ points, but did not attend to the infants themselves. In a second condition, she 
reacted positively towards the infants, but did not attend to the target of their points. In a 
third condition, she did not react at all and in the final condition she alternated her 
attention between the infants and the targets of their pointing gestures. Results suggested 
that infants were only satisfied when the experimenter alternated her attention between 
them and the event to which they pointed.
The above evidence suggests that the drive to affiliate may influence behaviour 
from early in development. In adults, however, some of the strongest evidence that the 
drive to affiliate influences behaviour comes from studies in which experimenters have
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attempted to induce the drive to affiliate and measured the impact on subsequent j
behaviour (e.g., Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). As yet, no studies have used such a design 
with infants or young children. In Chapter 4 of this thesis, I describe an experiment 
which manipulates the importance of affiliation to infants and measures the impact on 
their social behaviour.
I
1.3.2 Are young children and infants able to understand the social goals and intentions 
of those around them ?
In order for normative influence to occur, individuals must understand more than 
others’ goals and intentions towards objects, they must understand their social goals and 
intentions, for example, intentions to affiliate and reject. Such understanding is important 
because it enables individuals to modify their own social behaviour in order to maximise 
their chances of positive interactions with other group members. Evidence in favour of 
infants’ ability to understand others’ social intentions comes predominantly from looking 
time studies. Premack and Premack (1997), for example, found that 12-month-old 
infants were able to discriminate between two agents who were engaged in a positive 
interaction (for example, helping or hugging each other) from two agents who were 
engaged in a negative interaction (for example, hitting or hindering each other).
In similar research, Hamlin, Wynn and Bloom (2007) investigated infants’ 
understanding of helping behaviour more specifically. Hamlin et al. presented 10-month- 
old infants with scenes in which one shape, for example a yellow triangle, appeared to 
help a red circle up a hill. A blue square, on the other hand, appeared to hinder the 
circle’s ascent up the hill. At test, the circle either approached the helper (the triangle) or
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the hinderer (the square)/ Results showed that infants looked significantly longer at 
scenes in which the circle approached the hinderer. Hamlin et al. interpreted this as 
evidence that the infants had formed expectations about the social relationships between 
the three shapes and expected the circle to seek out the company of the helper rather than 
the hinderer.
i
Recently, Vaish, Carpenter and Tomasello (2009) investigated infants’ 
understanding of social intentions using a more active dependent measure. Vaish et al. 
presented 18-month-old infants with scenarios in which an experimenter caused harm to a 
third party. For example, the experimenter deliberately tore up a picture that the third 
party had drawn. Even though the third party showed no emotional cues indicative of 
distress, infants gave her significantly more concerned looks than in a control condition 
where the experimenter tore up an object which did not belong to her (see also Hobson, 
Harris, Garcia-Perez, & Hobson, 2009). Furthermore, when offered the opportunity to 
help either the victim or a neutral person, infants were significantly more likely to help 
the victim. These results suggest that infants had understood the nature of the third party 
interaction and were thus able to sympathise with the victim even though she showed no 
emotional cues indicating her distress.
1.3.3 Do social goals influence the imitative behaviour o f young children and infants?
In order to be considered analogous to normative influence, children’s imitation 
would need to be influenced by social goals, specifically goals to affiliate. Evidence in 
favour of this proposition comes from research demonstrating that infants and young 
children sometimes copy the specific actions used by a model even though reproduction
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of those actions is not necessary to achieve the same result. For example, Horner and 
Whiten (2005) presented 3- and 4-year-old children and chimpanzees with a 
demonstration of how to open a transparent box. Some of the actions involved in this 
demonstration were causally necessary to open the box, and some were unnecessary. 
Whereas chimpanzees copied only those actions which were causally necessary, children 
copied both the necessary and unnecessary actions. In similar research, Nagell, Olguin 
and Tomasello (1993) presented 2-year-old children and chimpanzees with a 
demonstration in which a model retrieved a toy using a rake. In one condition the model 
used this rake tool efficiently and in the other, she used it inefficiently. Children, but not 
chimpanzees, copied the specific actions of the model even when this resulted in less 
efficient performance on their part. This case is particularly interesting because, in an 
apparent analogy to Asch’s conformity experiment, the operation of social goals induced 
children to perform sub-optimally.
In cases such as these, social motivation has been taken as a default explanation; 
if children choose not to copy selectively, then their motivation for imitating must be 
social rather than instrumental. Perhaps not surprisingly then, these data are open to 
alternative explanations. For example, Homer and Whiten (2005) suggested that children 
in their study interpreted the irrelevant actions as intentional and so copied them for that 
reason. This explanation is made more plausible by the fact that Homer and Whiten 
demonstrated the action sequence on the box a total of three times. Thus children had an 
opportunity to watch the model repeatedly perform the irrelevant actions. However, 
chimpanzees also have some understanding of intentional action (e.g., Call, Hare, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2004) and yet did not copy the irrelevant actions used by the
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model, so this/explanation alone cannot explain the differences in their copying 
behaviour.
Another possible explanation is that children reinterpreted the causal structure 
behind the action sequences such that they came to view the irrelevant actions as causally 
necessary (Lyons, Young, & Keil, 2007). Lyons et al. claim that when children observe a
i
model demonstrating a series of actions, they have a strong tendency to encode all of 
those actions as causally necessary and so implicitly revise their causal understanding of 
the objects involved in the demonstration. This revision of their causal understanding 
leads them to imitate all o f the demonstrated actions. Based on this theory, Lyons et al. 
predicted that overimitation should be unavoidable. In order to test this prediction, Lyons 
et al. showed 3- to 5-year-old children demonstrations which included irrelevant actions. 
Prior to these demonstrations, children participated in a training phase in which they were 
reinforced for identifying actions which were ‘silly and unnecessary’. Even though 
children were correctly able to identify the unnecessary actions, they still overimitated 
(copying both the relevant and irrelevant actions) when offered the opportunity to act on 
the box. In a further experiment, Lyons et al. showed that, even when the experiment 
appeared to be finished, children maintained a tendency to overimitate. Lyons et al.’s 
general argument is supported by Whiten (in press) who claims that children may use a 
‘copy all -  refine/correct later’ heuristic in their imitation. Whiten argues that this 
heuristic is an evolutionarily adaptive strategy which enables children to learn about 
causally opaque objects and artifacts.
However, we know from other research that children do sometimes copy 
selectively, for example, they copy intentional over accidental actions (Carpenter et al.,
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1998) and complete failed attempts (Meltzoff, 1995). If we accep^ Whiten (in press) and 
Lyon et al.’s (2007) argument, then we are left with an apparent paradox in which 
children sometimes copy selectively and sometimes copy exactly. Another element to 
the puzzle is that overimitation appears to increase with age, with 5-year-olds showing 
more overimitation than 3-year-olds, and adults showing even greater levels of 
overimitation than 5-year-olds (Whiten, in press, although see Horowitz, 2003, for a 
different perspective on adults’ imitation). If we accept the social hypothesis, however, 
this apparent paradox disappears: children copy selectively when they have instrumental 
goals and copy more exactly when they have social goals. Moreover, if overimitation is a 
social skill, then it is no surprise that the tendency to copy exactly increases with age.
Indeed, there is a growing body of evidence in favour of this social hypothesis. 
Eckermann, Davis, and Didow (1989), for example, found that during the second year of 
life, infants begin to coordinate play with peers, choosing to play with similar objects as 
their peers, and to use those objects in similar ways. Eckermann et al. speculate that the 
function of these imitative exchanges may be to help generate and sustain interaction 
between the two infants (Eckermann et al., 1989; Eckermann & Didow, 1989). Although 
this argument seems highly plausible, experimental evidence is necessary in order to fully 
understand the relationship between imitation and affiliation.
Nielsen (2006) provided the first direct test of the connection between affiliation 
and imitation in infants and young children (although see Bandura & Huston, 1961, for a 
similar test with older children). Nielsen (2006) invited children to watch a 
demonstration in which a model opened a box using a tool. What varied between 
conditions was the nature of the model: in one condition the model was warm and
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friendly and in the other condition they were cold and aloof. The results varied with age: 
18-month-olds opened the same number of boxes in each condition, but were 
significantly more likely to copy the style with which the model performed the action in 
the social condition. The results for the twenty-four-month-olds were more ambiguous: 
they opened significantly more boxes in the social condition, but showed no difference in
I
their tendency to copy the model’s style. These results suggest that imitation varies 
according to social factors, but the specific nature of the effect is not clear. Furthermore, 
it is not clear whether children imitated the actions of the warm model more closely 
because they liked her more or because they sought to affiliate with her.
An experiment by Nielsen, Simcock and Jenkins (2008) provides further support 
for the claim that children vary their imitation depending on the social availability of the 
model. Nielsen et al. compared 24-month-olds’ imitation of an interactive model, who 
communicated with them through a closed circuit TV system, to imitation of a non- 
interactive model, whose actions were presented on video. Children in the ‘interactive’ 
condition were significantly more likely to copy the specific actions of the model than 
children in the ‘non-interactive’ condition. Although these data clearly demonstrate that 
imitation varies according to social factors, once again the specific nature of the effect is 
not clear: it is not clear from this study whether children imitated the interactive model 
more closely because they preferred her or because they sought to affiliate with her.
An earlier study by Thelen, Miller, Fehrenbach, Frautschi and Fishbein (1980) 
suggests that older children may use imitation strategically in order to affiliate, or 
ingratiate themselves, with other individuals. Thelen et al. (1980) asked 10-year-old 
children to play a game with another child. Children in a ‘social influence’ condition
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were told that they would later be expected to persuad^ this child to do something 
unpleasant (eat some unappealing looking crackers). Children in this ‘social influence’ 
condition were significantly more likely to copy the second child than children in a 
control condition. Thelen et al. interpret this as evidence that children in the ‘social
influence’ condition were using imitation strategically in order to ingratiate themselves
I
with the other child. This study is convincing because the model’s behaviour was held 
constant across conditions and the children’s own goals were manipulated. However, the 
control condition chosen by Thelen et al. complicates the interpretation of the results. 
Whereas children in the experimental condition were told they would later have to 
convince the model of something, children in the control condition were not told anything 
about the model. Thus it is possible that children in the experimental condition were 
paying more attention to the model simply because they would have to interact with her 
later, rather than because they had a goal to ingratiate themselves with her.
1.3.4 Summary
This section discussed whether social imitation in development can be seen as 
analogous to normative influence. I analysed whether infants and young children have a 
need to belong to the group and a drive to affiliate with their group members. Following 
this, I investigated whether they understand the social goals and intentions of those 
around them and whether their own social goals influence their imitation. This 
discussion raised a number of important questions for future research. First, although 
there is some evidence that the need to belong influences children’s behaviour, few 
experiments have been designed to directly test this question. Chapter 3 deals with this
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/issue: in that chapter, I investigate whether exposure to ostracism influences the social 
behaviour of young children. Chapter 4 complements this research by investigating the 
influence of affiliation on behaviour in infancy. Second, although it appears that 
children’s imitation varies according to social factors, it is not yet clear whether children 
increase their imitation when affiliation is important to them. Chapter 3 deals with this
I
issue by testing whether children increase their imitation when their sense of 
belongingness has been threatened.
1.4 The co-occurrence of instrumental and social imitation
Thus far, I have described informational and normative influence, and the 
instrumental and social functions of imitation, as though they operate separately. The 
reality of the situation is more complex: informational and normative forms of influence 
are commonly found together (Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955).
Behaviour in the Asch paradigm, for example, appears to reflect both forms of influence.
This is evidenced by the fact that, when asked to make their decisions in private, 
participants still show some conformity, thus suggesting that informational as well as 
normative influence plays a role in guiding their responses (Deutsch & Gerard, 1995).
Indeed Turner (1991) has argued that the two forms of influence are inseparable.
Cases which appear to reflect informational influence, for example, learning to use tools, 
have a strong social component: tools are socially created and their appropriate use is 
socially determined. Moreover, cases which appear to reflect purely normative influence 
also have a strong informational component: we do not accept the opinions of our group 
members merely to affiliate with them; we accept their opinions because we believe them
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to be correct and appropriate. In formulati/ig Self Categorisation Theory, Turner (1984, 
1991; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) argued that influence is a 
unitary phenomenon. As Self Categorisation Theory is primarily a theory of intergroup 
relations, it is difficult to combine with the developmental study of imitation, which has
primarily been studied in dyadic interaction. However, Turner’s critique of the
(
normative/informational distinction is highly relevant to our discussion.
Just as the informational and normative forms of influence overlap, so do the 
instrumental and social functions of imitation (Carpenter, 2006). Indeed, in many 
situations, they appear to be inseparable. One such situation is teaching. Within a 
teaching situation, an experienced individual may demonstrate an instrumental skill to a 
child with the help of social cues. To the extent that the child participates in the learning 
situation and responds to the model’s social cues, their imitation is neither purely 
instrumental nor purely social. Gergely and Csibra (2006) have found that 14-month-old 
infants are responsive to social/teaching cues when learning instrumental actions.
Gergely and Csibra (2006) presented infants with a model who performed an unusual 
action; turning a light box on with her head. In one condition, the model communicated 
that this information was important by ostensively shifting her gaze between the infant 
and the light box whereas, in the other condition, she gave no such cues. Infants who had 
observed the ostensive cues were significantly more likely to reproduce the unusual 
means used by the model than infants who did not observe the ostensive cues.
Another area in which the instrumental and social functions overlap is normative 
behaviour (Turner, 1991). Learning appropriate social behaviour is similar to learning 
instrumental skills in that there is a correct way to perform the actions involved.
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However, norms are inherently social because the rules they embody are socially /
constituted. Rakoczy, Wameken and Tomasello (2008) showed that 3-year-old children 
are sensitive to normative rules. Rakoczy et al. (2008) presented 2- and 3-year-old 
children with a demonstration of how to play a ‘daxing’ game. This game had a 
particular rule such that to ‘dax’ it was necessary to push a block across a board towards I
t
a gutter. Once children had been shown the rule, a puppet was introduced. This puppet 
violated the rules of the game; announcing his intention to ‘dax’ and then carrying out an 
inappropriate action (tipping the board on which the block was placed). The 3-year-old 
children, and to some extent the 2-year-old children, protested about this rule violation, 
sometimes with explicit normative protests “No! It does not go like this!” and sometimes 
with imperative protests “No! Not in this hole!” Children did not protest in a control 
condition where the puppet conducted the same action outside of the game context.
Perhaps the paradigmatic example of a form of social learning which is neither 
purely social nor instrumental is language learning. Language is a normative system, 
created by people in order to achieve social goals. Thus, language is an intrinsically 
social activity. As with any other normative system, however, there is a correct way for 
language to be spoken. In this respect, learning a language mirrors the acquisition of 
conventional instrumental actions. It follows that, although children’s early 
communication is a means by which to affiliate with their social partners, it would be 
highly beneficial for children to analyse the goals and intentions behind utterances and 
imitate them selectively when offered the chance to do so. As outlined above, Chapter 2 
addresses this very issue.
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1.5 Unintentional social influence
Thus far, I have discussed only relatively direct and explicit forms of behaviour 
matching. This mirrors traditional research on social influence which has concentrated 
on ‘conscious’ processes (see Bargh, 2008, for further elaboration of this point) and 
reflects the vast majority of developmental research on imitation, which has concentrated
I
on relatively direct forms of social interaction. However, research in social psychology 
has shown that a great deal of social influence and behaviour matching occurs without the 
formation of conscious intentions.
One example of subconscious social influence is adults’ tendency to mimic the 
mannerisms of their conversation partners. This tendency was most clearly demonstrated 
by Chartrand and Bargh (1999). Chartrand and Bargh (1999) asked participants to 
interact with a confederate who surreptitiously engaged in one of two behaviours, either 
rubbing their face or tapping their foot. Analysis of the participants’ behaviour revealed 
that they automatically matched the behaviour of the confederate. A subsequent funneled 
debriefing session revealed that participants were not aware of their mimicry. Other 
research has shown that adults mimic the facial expressions (Lundqvist & Dimberg,
1995; Zajonc, Adelmann, Murphy, & Niedenthal, 1987), emotions (Ramanathan & 
McGill, 2008) and syntax (Levelt & Kelter, 1982) of their social partners.
This subtle form of social influence appears to be motivated by the same goals as 
more explicit forms of influence. The tendency for adults to mimic their social partners 
is closely related to the need to belong and the drive to affiliate. In one demonstration of 
this, Lakin, Chartrand and Arkin (2008) showed that adults increase their tendency to 
mimic when their belongingness within a group had been threatened. Participants who
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had been excluded from an online ball game subsequently showed a greater tendency to 
mimic the mannerisms of a model than participants who had been included in the ball 
game. Lakin et al. (2008) argued that participants who had been ostracised used mimicry 
as a means by which to affiliate with others, and so recover their position within the 
group. In a related experiment, Lakin and Chartrand (2003) gave participants either a
I
conscious or a nonconscious goal to affiliate. Participants given either type of affiliation 
goal increased their tendency to mimic the mannerisms of a confederate relative to 
participants in a control group who were not given an affiliation goal.
It is not clear when children first show this tendency to subconsciously mimic the 
mannerisms of their conversation partners. Bargh (2008) and Dijksterhuis (2001) have 
explicitly compared mimicry in adults to neonatal matching of facial expressions. 
Meltzoff and Moore (1977) presented infants with a model who alternated between bouts 
of protruding his tongue and opening his mouth. Infants tended to protrude their tongue 
during tongue protrusion models and open their mouths during mouth opening models. 
However, these results are highly controversial. In a review of several studies, Anisfeld
(2005) found that tongue protrusion was the only behaviour to be reliably imitated. 
Moreover, empirical work by Jones (1996, 2006) has suggested that the tongue protrusion 
effect is caused by increased arousal rather than the model’s behaviour per se: infants 
also stick out their tongue in response to observing a pen move towards their face (see 
Heyes, 2001) and in response to interesting events in the environment such as a music 
playing (Jones, 2006). Thus, contrary to the claims of Dijksterhuis (2001) and Bargh
(2008), neonatal tongue protrusion may not be equivalent to adults’ tendency to match 
the behaviour of their social partners. One interesting possibility, however, is that older
36
I
infants’ and children’(5 tendency to copy the style with which a model performs an action 
may be motivated by the same goals as adults’ tendency to mimic the mannerisms of 
their conversation partners. The relation between these two forms of copying behaviour 
is further discussed in Chapter 3.
Another form of subtle influence is social priming. In social learning research,
I
priming has often been contrasted with imitation as an alternative, lower level 
explanation for apparent matching behaviour. For example, Byrne and Russon (1998), as 
well Huang, Heyes and Charman (2002) and Want and Harris (2001), have pointed out 
the need to distinguish stimulus enhancement (where an internal representation of an 
object is primed as a result of observing a conspecific interact with it) from imitation.
In adult work, however, priming has been conceptualised rather differently.
Bargh and colleagues have shown that it is possible to prime high level social concepts, 
character traits, goals and stereotypes (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996). Djiksterhuis and Bargh 
(2001; see also Dijksterhuis, 2001, 2005) have described this form of priming as a type of 
behaviour matching, similar to imitation. Dijksterhuis (2005) points out that, as adults, 
we ‘see’ a lot more in our social partners than is visually available. When observing a 
social partner, we make inferences about their character traits and behavioural 
predispositions. Through social priming, we match our behaviour to these activated 
traits, goals and stereotypes. Macrae and Johnson (1998), for example, primed 
participants with the concept of helpfulness, by asking them to unscramble a series of 
sentences which contained words related to that concept (see Srull and Wyer, 1979, for 
the first demonstration of this priming technique). At a later point, an experimenter 
‘accidentally’ dropped some pens on the floor. Results showed that participants primed
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with helpfulness picked up significantly more pens than participants giv^n a neutral 
prime. In similar work, Bargh et al. (1996) primed participants with either rudeness or 
politeness using the scrambled sentence paradigm. Participants who had been exposed to 
words related to politeness were more polite within a subsequent social interaction than 
participants exposed to words related to the trait of rudeness.
I
Further work has demonstrated that traits do not need to be activated directly in 
order to influence social behaviour. Bargh et al. (1996) presented participants with words 
related to the concept of the elderly. Participants who had been presented with this 
elderly prime subsequently walked more slowly down the corridor than participants 
presented with a neutral prime. In this experiment, ‘slowness’ was not directly primed; it 
was activated through its association with the stereotype of the elderly. In a related 
experiment, Bargh et al. (1996) primed participants with subliminally presented 
photographs of African American faces. Non-African American participants who had 
been primed with these images were subsequently more aggressive than participants in a 
control condition. In this experiment, photographs of members of a particular social 
group were sufficient to lead participants to match their behaviour to the perceived 
stereotype of that group.
1.5.1 Summary
In this section I moved away from traditional social influence research and 
discussed more subtle forms of social influence and behaviour matching, especially social 
priming. To date, there has been no research investigating this type of subtle social 
influence in infants and young children. Chapter 4 addresses this point. In that chapter, I
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investigate the influence o f priming affiliation on infants’ helping behaviour. The theme 
of subtle social influence is also relevant in Chapter 3 where I investigate the influence of 
priming ostracism on children’s social behaviour.
1.6 Supimary and overview of this thesis
/
This review sought to unite the literature on social learning with the literature on 
social influence. In the first two sections of this review, I outlined traditional research on 
social influence suggesting that adults’ tendency to adopt the behaviour of others is 
motivated by goals to learn from, and affiliate with others. I argued that imitation in 
young children may be motivated by similar goals; in other words, that imitation serves 
both an instrumental and a social function in development. In the latter part of this 
review, I argued that, in addition to explicit forms of behaviour matching, adults often 
subconsciously match the behaviour of their group members. I moved on to discuss 
whether young children and infants show a similar tendency to subconsciously assimilate 
their behaviour to those around them. In the following chapters, I investigate a series of 
questions which have been raised by this review. Chapters 2 and 3 explore the 
instrumental and social functions of imitation in children. In Chapter 2 ,1 investigate 
whether children analyse the behaviour of others in order to decide what to imitate. In 
particular, I investigate whether verbal imitation is based on intention understanding. In 
Chapter 3, I investigate whether children are motivated to imitate for social reasons, in 
order to fulfill a need to belong. In order to do this, I prime children with scenes 
indicating social exclusion and measure the impact on their imitative performance. In 
Chapter 4, I continue the theme of priming and investigate whether even infants will
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assimilate their behaviour to subtle social cues in the environment. In particular, I test 
whether subtle cues to affiliation are sufficient to increase helping behaviour in 18- 
month-olds.
f
(
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I Chapter 2
Instrumental Behaviour Matching: Is Verbal Imitation Based on
Intention Understanding?
1 2.1 Introduction
In my General Introduction, I argued that in order to be considered analogous to 
informational influence, instrumental imitation needed to be based on understanding the 
goals and intentions of a model. The claim that imitation is based on intention 
understanding is, however, controversial. In contrast to the intention-based account, 
some researchers have argued that imitation is primarily based on direct matching 
(Iacobini, Woods, Brass, Bekkering, Mazziotta, & Rizzolatti, 1999) or associative 
learning (Heyes, 2001). To date, this debate has concentrated almost exclusively on 
action imitation. In this chapter, I attempt to shed fresh light on the topic by investigating 
the relatively neglected domain of verbal imitation.
2.1.1 What are the cognitive mechanisms underlying imitation?
There are three main accounts of the cognitive mechanisms underlying action 
imitation; the direct matching account (Iacaboni et al., 1999), the associationist account 
(Heyes, 2001), and the intention-based account (Bekkering et al., 2000; Carpenter et al., 
1998). Direct matching accounts claim that humans possess an innate imitation 
mechanism through which visual input from observed actions is matched to 
proprioceptive feedback from self-produced actions (Meltzoff, 1993). The strongest 
support for directing matching accounts has come from the discovery of mirror neurons
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(Iacaboni et al., 1999; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, 2002; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, 
Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). These neurons, located in the ventral premotor cortex of the 
macaque, fire both when a monkey observes an action and when it performs a similar 
action itself (Rizzolatti et al., 2002). Imaging studies have shown that there is a 
comparable ‘mirror system’ in humans which could provide a neurological basis for
I
common coding between observed and produced acts (Meltzoff & Decety, 2003). 
However, the strong formulation of this account is incompatible with results suggesting 
that imitation is experience dependent; changing both with development (Over, 
Petschauer, & Tomasello, 2009; Perra & Gattis, 2008) and with relatively brief training 
(Gillmeister, Catmur, Liepelt, Brass, & Heyes, 2008).
In contrast to the direct matching account, the associationist account claims that 
imitation is highly experience dependent (Heyes, 2001). According to this account, 
imitation results from a series of excitatory vertical links between sensory and motor 
representations. These links are generated through concurrent observation and execution 
of the same actions (Bird & Heyes, 2005). When compared to the direct matching 
account, this account gains strong support from data showing that the ‘mirroring’ 
properties of the mirror system are not necessarily innate, but can change and even 
reverse with training (Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2007; Catmur, Gillmeister, Bird, Liepelt, 
Brass, & Heyes, 2008). In one demonstration on this, Catmur et al (2008) trained a group 
of adult participants to imitate a series of hand and foot actions presented on a computer 
screen. A second group of participants were trained to counterimitate; that is, respond to 
hand stimuli with foot responses and foot stimuli with hand responses. fMRI data 
revealed that, after counter-imitative training, the properties of the mirror system were
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reversed; brain areas which showed greater responding to hand actions in the compatible /
group showed greater responding to foot actions in the incompatible group. The
associative account is also compatible with evidence suggesting that non-human animals
can be trained to imitate (Heyes, 2001; Mui, Hazel grove, Pearce, & Heyes, 2008) and
with studies demonstrating that adults automatically imitate the gestures and mannerisms
/
of their social partners (Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009). Although associations no doubt 
play an important role in imitation, they cannot be the whole story: there is a growing 
body of research suggesting that imitation is a selective, interpretative process based on 
understanding the goals and intentions of a model.
The intention-based account proposes that the mapping between perception and 
action is cognitively-mediated. Behaviours are not replicated as unified motor patterns, 
but are broken down and reconstructed in terms of their goals (Bekkering et al, 2000;
Gattis, Bekkering, & Wohlschlager, 2002). This account is compatible with a large body 
of empirical evidence suggesting that both children’s and adults’ imitations 
systematically deviate from modeled behaviour depending on their interpretation of the 
model’s goals and intentions. For example, infants (Carpenter et al., 2005), young 
children (Bekkering et al., 2000; Gleissner, Meltzoff, & Bekkering, 2000) and adults 
(Wohlschlager, Bekkering, & Gattis, 2003) imitate the same action differently depending 
on its perceived goal. Moreover, infants copy intentional actions but not mistakes 
(Carpenter et al., 1998) or failed attempts (Meltzoff, 1995). Further research has 
suggested that, not only do young children use an understanding of intentions-in-action in 
their imitation, they also use an understanding of more complex prior intentions 
(Carpenter et al., 2002).
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Although many are now convinced by the intention-based account (Carpenter et 
al., 1998; Carpenter et al., 2002; Carpenter et al., 2005; Meltzoff, 1995), some 
researchers within the associationist tradition maintain that such a rich interpretation of 
these data is unwarranted (e.g. Heyes, 2001). Many of the apparently convincing 
demonstrations of intention-based imitation can, in reality, be explained by lower level
I
processes such as stimulus enhancement (increased attention towards an object as a result 
of seeing a conspeciflc interact with it), emulation (learning the affordances of objects in 
a demonstration) (Huang et al., 2002; Huang, Heyes, & Charman, 2006) and perceptual 
salience (Bird et al., 2007).
2.1,2 Is verbal imitation based on intention-understanding?
Compared to the debate surrounding action imitation, there has been relatively 
little discussion of the mechanisms underlying verbal imitation. Most strikingly, there 
has been very little discussion of whether verbal imitation is based on understanding the 
goals and intentions of a model (although see Tomasello, 1999). There is, however, some 
evidence to suggest that verbal imitation is cognitively mediated. Research using elicited 
imitation paradigms has shown that children do not always copy utterances exactly; as 
they acquire knowledge of their native grammar, they start to correct ungrammatical 
sentences (e.g., Akhtar, 1999; Bohannon, 1975; Love & Parker-Robinson, 1972; Scholes, 
1969; Slobin & Welsh, 1973; Weener, 1971). For example, Slobin and Welsh (1973) 
found that, when their subject was presented with sentences which included 
ungrammatical repetitions, she would correct them in her imitation (by omitting the 
repetitions). Similar results were found by Love and Parker-Robinson (1972) who
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showed that children were more accurate in their imitation of grammatical sentences than j 
ungrammatical sentences. Results such as these have been taken as evidence that 
children, like adults, remember the gist of linguistic information. When asked to imitate, 
they use their grammatical knowledge in order to produce a ‘best guess’ about the 
original form of the sentence. This best guess leads them to produce grammatical
I
sentences in place of the ungrammatical models (Hulme, Maughan, & Brown, 1991; ^
Gathercole, Frankish, Pickering, & Peaker 1999). According to this account, verbal 
imitation relies on memory processes and grammatical knowledge, but not on intention 
understanding (see Tessari and Rumiati, 2004, for a similar view of action imitation).
However, the literature on action imitation suggests an alternative and even richer 
interpretation of these data. As mentioned above, starting from infancy, children appear 
to copy intentional actions but not mistakes (Carpenter et al., 1998) or failed attempts 
(Meltzoff, 1995). An ungrammatical sentence can be seen as equivalent to a failed 
attempt to perform an action; although there is a failure in the surface form of the 
utterance, it succeeds nonetheless in conveying an intention to the listener. Based on this 
analogy, it is possible that children’s tendency to correct ungrammatical sentences is 
based not solely on their grammatical knowledge, but also on a tendency to copy the 
perceived intentions behind speech.
If this interpretation of the existing data were valid, it would be particularly 
interesting because it would suggest that young children take communicative intentions, 
as well as prior intentions and intentions-in-action, into account when deciding what to 
copy. We know from previous research that infants understand communicative intentions
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from at least 12 months (Beline, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2005), but we do not yet know 
whether they use this understanding when deciding what to imitate.
2.1.3 The current experiments
In this series of studies, I tested whether verbal imitation is based oni
(
understanding the intentions of a speaker. In doing so, I simultaneously investigated 
whether imitation more generally involves intention understanding, and whether children 
take a model’s communicative intentions into account when deciding what to copy.
In order to answer these questions, I drew on Meltzoff s (1995) behavioural 
reenactment paradigm. Meltzoff (1995) compared 18-month-olds’ imitation of 
successful actions and failed attempts. Infants in a Demonstrate (target) condition 
observed a model perform a successful action; for example pulling two-halves of a toy 
dumbbell apart. Infants in a second, Demonstrate (intention), condition observed a 
‘failed attempt’ to perform the same action; they watched the model’s hands repeatedly 
slip from the ends of the dumbbell. When offered the opportunity to imitate, infants in 
both conditions reproduced the goal of the action (pulling the toy apart) in equivalent 
numbers, and did so significantly more often than infants in a control condition who 
observed an irrelevant action on the toy. In other words, infants in the Demonstrate 
(intention) condition reproduced the intended goal of the action rather than the surface 
behaviour they observed.
Further evidence in favour of this interpretation was provided by a second 
experiment in which Meltzoff compared imitation of a human model to imitation of a 
mechanical device. In a Demonstrate (intention) condition, the scenario was identical to
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the one outlined above; infants watched a human model try to pull two halves ofjthe toy
dumbbell apart. In a second, Demonstrate (mechanical slippage) condition, infants 
watched a pair of mechanical pincers perform a similar movement; the two claws 
repeatedly slipped from the end of the toy. When offered the opportunity to imitate,
that infants had attributed an intention to the human model but not to the mechanical 
device.
In these studies, I combined the logic of M eltzoff s experiments with an elicited 
imitation paradigm. In my first two experiments I replicate and extend previous results 
on elicited imitation showing that children correct ungrammatical sentences. In my 
critical third experiment I test whether children treat ungrammatical sentences differently 
when they are spoken by an ‘intentional’ model versus a ‘non-intentional’ model. If 
verbal imitation is based on intention understanding, then children should correct the 
ungrammatical utterances of the intentional model, but repeat the same utterances exactly 
when they are spoken by the ‘non-intentional’ model.
2.2 Experiment 1
In this experiment my main goal was to replicate previous research showing that 
young children correct ungrammatical sentences. Following Slobin and Welsh (1973), I 
chose to compare children’s imitation of grammatically correct sentences to their 
imitation of sentences with ungrammatical repetitions. In keeping with previous research 
on elicited imitation, I chose to test this prediction with 3-year-olds.
infants were significantly more likely to complete the action of the human model (pulling
Meltzoff interpreted this as' evidencethe toy apart) than that of the mechanical device.
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2.2.1 Method j
Participants
Participants were 20 children between the ages of 3, and 3 years, 11 months 
(mean age = 3 years, 5 months). Ten of these children were female and 10 male. A 
further 2 children were excluded as a result of equipment failure, and 2 for failure to 
complete the practice trials. Children were dropped for failure to complete the practice 
trials if they failed to repeat three or more sentences consecutively. Children did not have 
to repeat the practice trials exactly in order to be included; any response (whether 
grammatical or ungrammatical) was sufficient for inclusion in the data set. This meant 
that only children too shy to speak at all were excluded from the final data set. In all 
three studies, children were recruited from nurseries in the Cardiff area as well as from 
the city’s science museum and a database of families who had expressed an interest in 
participating in child development studies.
Materials
The five ungrammatical sentences were taken from the previously mentioned case 
study by Slobin and Welsh (1973). Each of these sentences included ungrammatical 
repetitions, for example, ‘I need need the ball’ and ‘Mark fell fell off the horse’. In order 
to compare performance on these test trials to children’s baseline tendency to copy 
sentences exactly, five control sentences were generated. These sentences were matched 
in terms of grammatical complexity rather than sentence length, for example, ‘I need the 
ball’, ‘Mark fell off the horse’ (see Table 2.1 for further details). Ten grammatically 
correct filler sentences were also created, each containing five words. In order to 
overcome children’s shyness in speaking to the experimenter, nine practice trials were
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generated. These sentences increased in length so that the first three Sentences contained 
only 1 word, the next three sentences contained 2 words, and the final three sentences 
contained 3 words (red, boo, door, small mouse, blue car, big dog, he fell down, a brown 
cat, a big apple). The test sentences were presented in two fixed orders such that half of 
children heard the sentence ‘Mark fell (fell) off the horse’ first, and half of children heard 
the sentence ‘1 need (need) the ball’ first. 't
Table 2.1. The test sentences used in Experiment 1
Test sentences: Grammatical condition Test sentences: Ungrammatical condition
I need the ball I need need the ball
Mark fell off the horse Mark fell fell off the horse
Mozart fell off the table Mozart fell off off the table
I can eat I can can can eat
Kitty was perking the ice cream Kitty was perking perking perking the ice
cream
Design
Children heard either the grammatically correct sentences or sentences with 
grammatical errors in a between-subjects design. The accuracy with which children 
reproduced the utterances was analysed.
Procedure
Each child was invited into a quiet room and asked to sit on the floor with the 
experimenter (E). After a brief warm up session, E introduced the copying game by 
asking ‘Can you say what I say’? Once the child understood the game, she/he heard and 
imitated the 9 practice sentences followed by the 5 test sentences. Each of the test
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sentences was preceded by two grammatically correct filler sentences. During the 
practice and test trials children were praised for each response they gave regardless of 
whether their response was grammatical or ungrammatical. Children were thus 
reinforced for speaking rather than for offering a particular type of response.
If a child refused to repeat a sentence, it was presented up to three times. After the third
i
attempt, E told the child they would try another sentence, and the game continued. 
Coding
Children’s responses were coded from audio-tape by the experimenter. Two 
coding categories were created: children could either copy the sentences exactly (‘exact’) 
or alter the sentences to an alternative grammatically correct form (‘alter’). In all three 
experiments, children also gave a small number of other responses (such as repeating 
only the final or most salient word in the sentence). As these responses are not relevant 
to the hypotheses, they are not discussed further. Twenty percent of the tapes were 
analysed by a second coder. Agreement between the two coders was 100%, Cohen’s 
Kappa = 1 .
2.2.2 Results
Figure 2.1 indicates the median number of times children produced exact copies 
and alterations of grammatical and ungrammatical sentences. Mann Whitney planned 
comparisons revealed that children were significantly more likely to copy the 
grammatical as opposed to ungrammatical sentences exactly (U=  1.5, N1 = 10, N2 = 10, 
p<.001, two-tailed, r = .85). Moreover, they were significantly more likely to alter the 
ungrammatical sentences to an alternative grammatically correct form (U=  15, N1 = 10,
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N2 = 10,/?=.002, two-tailed, r = .70). Children corrected |tie ungrammatical sentences 
either by dropping the repeated words, substituting the repeated words, or adding 
additional words to the sentences. For example, when presented with the ungrammatical 
sentence ‘I need need the ball’ some children chose to omit the meaningless repetition ‘I 
need the ball’, while others chose to substitute another word for the repetition, for 
example ‘I do need the ball’. These results replicate the results of previous elicited 
imitation studies and suggest that children correct sentences which include 
ungrammatical repetitions.
Grammatical Ungrammatical Grammatical Ungrammatical
sen tences sen tences sen tences sen tences
Exact Alter
Response/Condition
Figure 2.1. The results from Experiment 1: children’s reproductions of grammatical and 
ungrammatical sentences. The black bars indicate children’s tendency to copy the model 
sentences exactly. The white bars indicate children’s tendency to alter the sentences to 
an alternative, grammatically correct form. * indicates a statistically significant 
difference.
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In this experiment I sought to further refine my paradigm. I interpreted the data 
from Experiment 1 as evidence that children correct ungrammatical sentences (and so 
may copy the perceived intentions behind speech). However, an alternative interpretation 
of these data is that children failed to notice the ungrammatical repetitions (Slobin & 
Welsh, 1973). In this experiment, another sample of 3-year-olds were asked to imitate 
sentences which included either grammatical repetitions or ungrammatical repetitions. If 
children fail to notice repetitions, then they should omit the repetitions from both the 
grammatical and the ungrammatical sentences. However, if children correct 
ungrammatical sentences, then they should omit only the ungrammatical repetitions.
2.3.1 Method
Participants
Participants were 20 children between the ages of 3, and 3 years, 11 months 
(,mean age = 3 years, 6 months). Fourteen were female and 6 male. A further 2 children 
were excluded for failure to complete the practice trials. As in experiment 1, children 
were not expected to repeat the practice trials exactly; they were excluded only if they 
failed to offer 3 consecutive responses on the practice trials (regardless of whether those 
responses were grammatical or ungrammatical).
Materials
Eight test sentences were constructed. Four of these sentences included 
grammatical repetitions, e.g., ‘Sam was a big big cat’, and 4 contained ungrammatical 
repetitions, e.g., ‘The cat was too big big for the chair’ (see Table 2.2 for further details).
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The 9 practice trials, as well as 8 grammatically correct filler sentences were taken from 
Experiment 1.
Table 2.2. The test sentences used in Experiments 2 and, on the right, those also used in 
Experiment 3
Test sentences: Grammatical condition Test sentences: Ungrammatical condition
As in Experiment 1, children heard either grammatically correct sentences or 
sentences with grammatical errors in a between subjects design.
Procedure
The instructions, practice trials, and testing procedure were all identical to those 
used in Experiment 1.
Coding
Children’s reproductions were coded in to the same categories as Experiment 1: a 
child could either repeat the sentences exactly (‘exact’) or alter the sentences to an 
alternative grammatically correct form (‘alter’). As in Experiment 1, the data was coded 
from audio-tape by the experimenter and 20% of the dataset was analysed by a second 
coder. Agreement between the two coders was 100%, Cohen’s Kappa = 1.
He was in a dark dark house 
There there don’t cry 
He said bye bye to his horse 
Sam was a big big cat
It was dark dark outside
There there is the park
He went to buy buy a horse
The cat was too big big for the chair
Design
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2.3,2 Results /
Figure 2.2 indicates the median number of times children produced exact copies 
and alterations of sentences with grammatical and ungrammatical repetitions. Mann 
Whitney planned comparisons revealed that children were significantly more likely to 
copy sentences with grammatical as opposed to ungrammatical repetitions exactly ((7=7,
I
N1 = 10, N2 = 10,/?<.001, two-tailed, r=.15). Moreover, they were significantly more 
likely to alter sentences with ungrammatical repetitions to an alternative grammatically 
correct form {U =6, N1 = 10, N2 = 10,/K.OOl, two-tailed, r=.79). These data 
demonstrate that children’s tendency to correct the ungrammatical sentences from 
Experiment 1 was not due to a failure to notice repetitions. This conclusion is consistent 
with a large body of work suggesting that children of this age correct ungrammatical 
sentences more generally (see Vinther, 2002).
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Figure 2.2. The results from Experiment 2: children’s reproductions of sentences with 
grammatical and ungrammatical repetitions. The black bars indicate children’s tendency 
to copy the model sentences exactly. The white bars indicate children’s tendency to alter 
the sentences to an alternative, grammatically correct form. * indicates a statistically 
significant difference.
2.4 Experiment 3
This experiment provided the critical test of the intention-based hypothesis. In 
this experiment, I compared imitation of ungrammatical sentences delivered by an 
apparently intentional agent, to imitation of the same sentences delivered by a non- 
intentional agent (as in Meltzoff, 1995). If children’s tendency to correct ungrammatical 
sentences is based solely on their grammatical knowledge and memory constraints, then 
they should correct both the intentional and the non-intentional model. However, if
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children imitate the intentions behind speech, then they should correct only the 
intentional model.
i
2,4,1 Method
Participants
Participants were 20 children between the ages of 3, and 3 years, 10 months 
(mean age = 3 years, 5 months). Ten were female and 10 male. A further 3 children 
were excluded for failure to complete the practice trials, and 1 for parental interference 
during the test phase.
Materials
A single recording of the audio stimuli was produced. The recording included the 
4 ungrammatical test sentences from Experiment 2, along with the 8 grammatically 
correct filler sentences and 6 of the practice sentences. The non-intentional agent was a 
green and yellow cardboard box, approximately 8 inches tall. The tape recorder was 
placed on a small shelf at the back of the box so that it was concealed. The intentional 
agent was a green and yellow soft toy frog, also 8 inches tall. The tape recorder was 
concealed in a small rucksack on the toy’s back. In order to ensure that the sound quality 
was held constant across conditions, the speakers were always left uncovered.
Design
Children heard the recording delivered by either the intentional or the non- 
intentional model in a between subjects design. The manipulation of perceived 
intentionality was based on research demonstrating that when either of two critical cues 
are present, children will attribute intentionality to an inanimate object. First, children
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will attribute intentionali/y to an inanimate object if it engages in a contingent interaction 
with them. For example, Johnson, Slaughter and Carey (1998) showed 12-months-olds 
an inanimate object (a furry brown object about the size of a beach ball) which either 
bleeped in response to infants’ babbling, or bleeped at random intervals. Infants were 
significantly more likely to follow the gaze of the inanimate object when its actions were
I
contingent upon theirs. Second, children will attribute intentionality to an object if it has 
features resembling a face: infants in the same Johnson et al. (1998) study were 
significantly more likely to follow the gaze of the inanimate object if it had facial features 
(see also Johnson, Booth, & O’Heam, 2001). Consequently, the perceived intentionality 
of the model was manipulated in two ways in this experiment: firstly by altering its 
physical appearance, and secondly by altering the nature of the children’s interaction with 
the toy. Whereas the toy frog had a face, the box had similar features arranged in a non­
face-like configuration. Whereas the frog engaged in a social interaction with the child 
prior to speaking the test sentences, the box did not (see Figure 2.3 for photographs of the 
intentional and non-intentional models).
57
IFigure 2.3. The models from Experiment 3. The left-hand panel shows the non- 
intentional model; a cardboard box. The right-hand panel shows the intentional model; a 
soft toy frog which engaged in a social interaction with the children.
Procedure
In both conditions, the copying game began identically: E asked the child to sit on 
the floor with them and, after a brief warm-up session, asked the child ‘Can you say what 
I say?’ Once the child understood the game, they completed the first three practice trials 
with E. After this, the model was introduced. The nature o f this introduction varied 
according to condition. In the non-intentional condition, E introduced the model by 
saying ‘Now look at this. This is just a box, and boxes can’t really speak can they? But if 
I press these buttons I can make it sound like the box is speaking. Can you say what the 
box says?’ In the intentional condition, the E introduced the child to the model by saying 
‘This is my friend Froggie. Can you wave to him?’ [child waves then Froggie waves] 
‘Froggie would really like to play this game with you. Can you say what Froggie says?’
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Once the chil^ agreed, E told the child that Froggie was really excited. The child then 
heard the final 6 practice sentences spoken by the model, followed by the 4 
ungrammatical test sentences. Each of the ungrammatical test sentences was preceded by 
two grammatically correct filler sentences. Once the child repeated a sentence, E played 
the next sentence. During both the practice sentences and the test phase, children were 
praised by E after each response they gave regardless of whether they produced a 
grammatically correct sentence or not. In this experiment, test sentences were presented 
only once: if a child failed to respond on the first presentation, the sentence was not 
repeated.
Coding
Twenty percent of the dataset was analysed by a second coder who was blind to 
experimental condition. Agreement between the two coders was 94%, Cohen’s Kappa = 
.881.
2.4.2 Results
Figure 2.4 indicates the median number of times children produced exact copies 
and corrections in response to the intentional and non-intentional models. Results 
supported the prediction that verbal imitation is based on intention understanding. Mann 
Whitney planned comparisons revealed that children were significantly more likely to 
copy the box than the frog exactly (U= 16, N1 = 10, N2 = 10,/?=.008, two-tailed, r=.59). 
Moreover, they were significantly more likely to correct the frog than the box (U= 23,
N1 = 10, N2 = 10, /?= .033, two-tailed, r=.47).
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Figure 2.4. The results from Experiment 3: children’s reproductions of the 
ungrammatical sentences spoken by the non-intentional versus the intentional model. The 
black bars indicate children’s tendency to copy the model sentences exactly. The white 
bars indicate children’s tendency to correct the model sentences. * indicates a 
statistically significant difference.
One possible objection to these results is that children could have been paying 
more attention in one of the conditions. Although every effort was made to make the frog 
and the box as visually similar as possible, the nature of the manipulation meant that 
there were dissimilarities between the two models. Thus, despite the fact that children 
heard an identical recording of the ungrammatical sentences in the two conditions, it is 
possible that children may have found either the frog or the box more interesting. The 
inclusion of grammatically correct filler sentences within the stimuli allowed me to test
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for! this possibility. If children were paying more attention in one of the conditions, then 
they would have been more accurate in repeating the filler sentences in that condition. 
However, a Mann Whitney test revealed no significant difference between the two 
conditions (U = 37, N1 = 10, N2 = 10,/? = .35, two-tailed).
i
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2.5 General discussion
In three experiments, I tested whether verbal imitation is based on intention 
understanding. In order to do this, I applied the logic of a well-known action imitation 
paradigm to the verbal domain. Meltzoff (1995) compared imitation of successful actions 
to imitation of failed attempts and found that, whereas infants copy successful actions 
exactly, they tend to correct failed attempts. In my first two experiments, I replicated and 
extended previous results showing an apparently analogous pattern of results in the verbal 
domain; whereas children copy grammatical sentences exactly, they tend to correct 
ungrammatical sentences. This held true even when both the grammatical and 
ungrammatical sentences contained repeated words.
Experiment 3 provided the critical test of the intention-based hypothesis. Again 
the paradigm was analogous to one used in the action domain. Meltzoff (1995) compared 
imitation of unsuccessful actions delivered by an intentional agent (a human model), to 
the same actions delivered by a non-intentional agent (a pair of mechanical pincers). 
Results showed that, whereas infants tended to correct the failed attempts of the human 
model, they copied the same actions exactly when performed by the pair of mechanical 
pincers. Meltzoff interpreted this as evidence that infants had attributed an intention to 
the human model but not to the mechanical device. In my third experiment, I compared
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imitation of unsuccessful (i.e., ungrammatical) utterances delivered by an intentional 
agent and a non-intentional agent. Children in both conditions heard the same audio­
recording of four ungrammatical sentences. The only thing which varied between 
conditions was the perceived intentionality of the model. In the non-intentional 
condition, the model was an inanimate cardboard box which the experimenter could
I
make talk by pressing a series of buttons. In the intentional condition, the model was a 
soft toy frog which engaged in a contingent social interaction with the child and the 
experimenter (see Johnson et al., 1998). Consistent with the intention-based hypothesis, 
children tended to correct the utterances of the apparently intentional frog, but repeat the 
utterances of the non-intentional box exactly.
At first glance, it seems possible to argue that, rather than being indicative of 
intention understanding, the results of Experiment 3 could be explained in terms of 
differential attention in the two conditions: perhaps children paid more attention to either 
the frog or the box, and varied their copying behaviour accordingly. However, closer 
inspection of the data makes this interpretation implausible. If children were paying 
more attention in one condition than the other, then we would have expected them to 
perform differently not only on the ungrammatical test sentences, but also on the 
grammatically correct filler sentences. When children’s reproduction of the 
grammatically correct filler sentences was analysed, children were found to be equally 
accurate in both conditions. Nevertheless, in future research it would be informative to 
equate the two conditions more closely. One means by which to do this would be to hold 
the identity of the model constant across conditions and manipulate social contingency 
alone (that is, present children with a soft toy frog which either did or did not engage in a
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contingent interaction with them). However, although this modification to the design 
would be a step closer to eliminating the attention-based explanation, it would not be 
entirely conclusive as contingent social interactions (and intentional agents) are 
presumably more interesting to children than non-contingent interactions (and non- 
intentional agents).
These data provide an important contribution to our understanding of the 
cognitive mechanisms underlying verbal imitation. There has been a great deal of 
research showing that children correct ungrammatical sentences of various forms (e.g., 
Akhtar, 1999; Slobin & Welsh, 1973; Vinther, 2002). The standard interpretation of 
these data is that children remember the gist of linguistic information. When asked to 
imitate, they use their grammatical knowledge in order to produce a ‘best guess’ about 
the original form of the sentence, leading them to correct ungrammatical sentences. 
According to this interpretation, verbal imitation relies on memory processes and 
grammatical knowledge, but not on intention understanding. The results of Experiment 3 
provide support for the claim that, although memory limitations may influence sentence 
reproduction, in the case of ungrammatical repetitions at least, children’s understanding 
of the intentionality of the speaker also plays a role. Children interpret ungrammatical 
repetitions as failed attempts and use their grammatical knowledge in order to accurately 
reproduce the perceived intentions behind the utterances. In the future, it would be 
interesting to extend these results to other forms of grammatical errors but, nevertheless, 
interpretation of past results using elicited imitation paradigms ought to be re-evaluated 
in light of these results.
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These studies also contribute to our Understanding of imitation more generally. 
Despite many apparently convincing demonstrations of intention-based imitation, several 
individual studies have been criticised for confounding intention-based imitation with 
lower level processes. To take just one example, MeltzofFs (1995) behavioural re­
enactment paradigm has been criticised for confounding intention-based imitation with
t
stimulus enhancement and emulation (Huang et al., 2002; 2006). Huang et al. (2002) 
showed that, when these two factors were controlled for, infants who observed a failed 
attempt were no more likely to produce the target action than infants in a control 
condition (although see Meltzoff, 2007, for an alternative viewpoint). When the data 
from these studies are combined with studies from the action domain (e.g., Bekkering et 
al., 2000; Carpenter et al., 1998; Gergely et al., 2002), they provide strong support for the 
claim that intention-understanding plays an integral role in imitation. Thus they present a 
serious challenge to those who claim that associative learning alone can explain 
imitation. Furthermore, these results go beyond previous results from the action domain 
by suggesting that children take communicative intentions, as well as prior intentions 
(Carpenter et al., 2002) and intentions-in-action (Carpenter et al., 1998; Meltzoff, 1995), 
into account when deciding what to copy.
Imitation is thus a powerful mechanism for learning how to achieve instrumental 
goals. In the physical domain, intention-based imitation enables children to leam the 
efficient use of tools and other objects, filtering out irrelevant actions and mistakes from 
the demonstrations they observe. Similarly within language, intention-based imitation 
may enable children to leam about the pragmatics of communication; filtering out
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mistakes and accidents from the linguistic demonstrations they hear in order to leam how / 
to efficiently achieve their communicative goals.
2.6 Suggestions for future research
2.6.1 Is verbal imitation based on intention understanding in younger children?
In this chapter, I sought to compare imitation in 3-year-old children to previous 
research with infants (e.g., Meltzoff, 1995). In future research, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether younger children also base their verbal imitation on intention 
understanding.
In an initial attempt to answer this question, I piloted a small number of 2-year- 
olds on their reproduction of the ungrammatical test sentences from Experiment 1. 
Unfortunately, the results were inconclusive. The most serious difficulty with this pilot 
was that the test sentences exceeded children’s production ability/working memory 
capacity. This meant that when they were asked to imitate a sentence such as ‘I need 
need the ball’, children tended to repeat either the final word or words of the sentence 
(for example, ‘ball’, ‘the ball’) or the most salient word (for example, ‘need’). A second 
problem was that these younger children were often to shy to repeat the utterances of the 
experimenter. This meant that very few children completed the practice sentences, let 
alone the test sentences.
In future research, it would be interesting to compare children’s imitation of 
grammatically correct two-word utterances, such as ‘More juice’, to their imitations of 
grammatically incorrect two-word utterances, such as ‘Juice more’. If 2-year-olds show a 
tendency to correct these simple ungrammatical test sentences (as previous research has
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suggested they might, e.g., Akhtar, 1999; Slobin & Welsh, 1973), it would then be 
possible to investigate whether they base their verbal imitation on intention 
understanding. As in Experiment 3 ,1 could test whether 2-year-old children are more 
likely to correct the ungrammatical utterances of an apparently intentional model than 
those of a non-intentional model. An experiment such as this would also need to include
i
a longer warm-up period to enable children to become more comfortable with the 
experimenter and test situation (and so more willing to imitate the models).
2,6.2 Do young children and infants take the knowledge state o f a model into account 
when deciding what to copy?
There has been a great deal of research investigating whether imitation is based 
on intention understanding (e.g., Carpenter et al., 1998; Huang et al., 2002; Meltzoff, 
1995). The experiments presented in this chapter went beyond previous research by 
showing that children use an understanding of communicative intentions, as well as prior 
intentions (Carpenter et al., 2002) and intentions-in-action (e.g., Meltzoff, 1995), when 
deciding what to imitate. Perhaps surprisingly, however, there has been very little 
discussion of whether children take other forms of mental states, such as knowledge and 
beliefs, into account when deciding what to copy.
f Previous research using other response measures has, however, suggested that
infants are able to distinguish between an experimenter who is knowledgeable and an 
experimenter who is ignorant. For example, 12-month-olds are more likely to helpfully 
point to the location of a fallen object when an experimenter is ignorant about its location 
than when he is knowledgeable about it (Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008).
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Recent evidence suggests that infants may even be able to understand true and false^ 
beliefs. Research using looking time measures has suggested that 15-month-old infants 
are able to pass the false belief task (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). More recently, 
Buttelmann, Carpenter and Tomasello (2009) demonstrated similar understanding in 18- 
month-olds using a more active dependent variable. Buttelmann et al. (2009) showed
I
that infants use their understanding about an experimenter’s true or false belief in order to 
decide what he needs help with as he attempts to open a box.
In an initial attempt to ascertain whether young children and infants take a 
model’s belief state into account when deciding what to copy, I created an imitation 
analog of the false belief task (Wimmer & Pemer, 1983). In this study, an experimenter 
demonstrated how to use a tool in order to retrieve one of a number of toys from a box.
A second experimenter then demonstrated a far simpler means of opening the box, 
retrieving a second toy by opening a concealed lid on the top of the box. Subsequent to 
this, the first experimenter retrieved another toy from the box, once again using the more 
complex tool-use technique in order to do so (see Figure 2.5 for photographs of the 
method used by each experimenter). The first experimenter then offered the child a 
chance to retrieve the final toy themselves. The critical manipulation was whether the 
first experimenter was present or absent during the second experimenter’s demonstration, 
and so whether she had a true or a false belief about the best means to retrieve toys from 
the box. I predicted that, if young children and infants take the model’s belief state into 
account when deciding what to copy, then they should copy her specific actions with the 
tool when she had a true belief, but not when she had a false belief.
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Figure 2.5. The two means o f retrieving toys from the box. The left hand panel shows 
the first experimenter using the more complex method: retrieving a toy using the tool.
The right hand panel shows the second experimenter using the simpler method: retrieving 
a toy by opening the concealed lid.
I tested a total of 75 children between the ages of 14- and 30-months on various 
versions o f this task. At no age did children distinguish between the different belief 
states o f the model. Among the 22 oldest children tested (all 30 months old), only 5 
performed correctly in both conditions. One interpretation of these results is that infants 
and young children do not discriminate between belief states. Such an interpretation 
would fit with traditional accounts suggesting that children do not pass the false belief 
task until the age o f four (e.g., Wimmer & Pemer, 1983), but is incompatible with more 
recent accounts suggesting that even infants understand false belief (e.g., Buttelmann et 
al., 2009). An alternative interpretation is that extraneous task demands were responsible 
for children's failure to pass the task. For example, the procedure placed considerable 
demands on working memory; if  children could not remember the models’ previous 
experience with the apparatus, then they would have failed the task regardless o f whether
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they had made inferences about the model’s belief state or not. Another problem may 
have been that children saw demonstrations from two different experimenters and so may 
have been unsure which experimenter to copy.
In future research, it would be interesting to investigate children’s imitation of 
knowledgeable vs. ignorant experimenters. This could be achieved using a much simplerI
paradigm than the one described above. One option would be to present children with an 
experimenter who opens a box behind an opaque screen (so that the children cannot see 
their actions). A second experimenter would either observe this demonstration or not, 
and then show the child how to open the box using a series of distinctive action steps. 
Based on a similar logic to that outlined above, I would predict that children would copy 
the second experimenter’s distinctive action style more often when she is knowledgeable 
about how to open the box (when she had seen the first demonstration) than when she is 
ignorant about how to open it (that is, when she had not seen the first demonstration). 
Although testing a simpler question, this paradigm has a number of advantages over the 
one outlined above. First, children would observe only one demonstration (rather than 
three), reducing the demands on their working memory and removing the decision about 
who to copy. Furthermore, the model would act on only one location on the object rather 
than two, removing noise associated with children’s preference for one of the two 
methods.
2.6.3 Do infants understand the intentional structure behind third party interactions?
Another interesting question for future research is whether young children and 
infants can understand and imitate the intentional structure behind third party
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interaction/;. The vast majority of imitation research has been conducted in ostensive 
contexts (Gergely & Csibra, 2006), where a model performs an action fo r  the child. We 
know from previous research that young children and infants are very good at learning 
from dyadic interactions o f this type (e.g., the experiments described in this chapter,
Carpenter et al., 1998; Meltzoff, 1995).
{
Nevertheless, if children are to take maximum advantage of the learning 
opportunities provided by the environment, then it would be highly beneficial for them to 
leam from observing third party interactions, as well as from interactions in which they 
are directly involved. Research into language acquisition has suggested that young 
children are able to leam novel words through overhearing two other individuals speak 
(Akhtar, Jipson, & Callanan, 2001) and related research on infants’ understanding of 
communicative intentions has shown that 14- and 18-month-olds are able to use 
communicative gestures directed towards a third party in order to locate a hidden toy 
(Grafenhain, Behne, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008).
In an initial attempt to test just how much infants understand about third party 
interactions, I investigated whether infants would imitate a model differently depending 
on her intentions towards a third party. I predicted that when a model used an unusual 
action style in order to help a third party, infants would not copy her specific actions 
(because the same constraints did not apply to them), but when the model freely chose the 
unusual action style, infants would copy her specific actions. I tested a total of 45 14- 
month-olds on various versions of this task. Despite various changes designed to 
simplify the procedure, infants did not vary their behaviour according to the nature of the 
third party interaction they observed. One possible reason for this is that the task
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remained too difficult for 14-month-olds to solve. Consequenty, in future research, it 
might be interesting to try a similar task with older children. Another possibility, 
however, would be to test the same age group with a task that involved simpler 
constraints (e.g., those used in Zmyj, Daum and Aschersleben, 2009).
In future research it would also be interesting to investigate other aspects of
I
infants’ understanding, and imitation, of third party interactions. One interesting question 
is whether infants and young children choose to copy demonstrations directed towards 
themselves and towards third parties in the same way. The social bond between the child 
and experimenter is greatly reduced (if not removed completely) in third party 
interactions. Based on the hypothesis that imitation serves an affiliative function in 
development, I would predict that children and infants would be significantly less likely 
to copy the style with which a model performs an action when they witness it within the 
context of a third party interaction.
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! Chapter 3
Social Behaviour Matching: Does Priming Third Party Ostracism 
Increase Affiliative Imitation in Children?
/ 3.1 Introduction
In my General Introduction, I argued that, in order to be considered analogous to 
normative influence, children’s imitation must be motivated by a drive to affiliate. I 
presented some evidence to suggest that young children possess a drive to affiliate and 
that this drive influences their imitation. However, I also pointed out that these claims 
are controversial (see, for example, Lyons et al., 2007, and Whiten, in press). In this 
chapter, I use insights from adult social psychology in order to (1) investigate aspects of 
the need to belong in development and (2) test whether the need to belong and the drive 
to affiliate influences children’s imitation.
3.1,1 Does the need to belong influence behaviour in development?
As discussed in the General Introduction, adults possess a profound need to 
belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). One indication of just how important belonging is 
to us is that we are incredibly sensitive to cues which indicate our social exclusion from 
the group. For example, exclusion from a relatively brief online game is sufficient to 
invoke feelings of sadness in adult participants (Williams et al., 2000). Williams et al. 
asked participants to play an online game in which they were led to believe that they were 
throwing a ball to two other participants. In reality, however, the computer was 
programmed to either include or exclude the participant from the ball game. Williams et
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al. found that participants who had been excluded fi^ om the game subsequently reported 
significantly lower mood than participants who had been included in the game.
Further research has shown that a sense of ostracism can even be evoked without 
any interaction at all, through priming. Sommer and Baumeister (2002) asked 
participants to rate whether a series of words presented on a computer screen were 
examples of people, places or things. Between these naming trials, prime words were 
flashed on the screen for a period of 90 milliseconds. For some participants, these words 
were related to social inclusion (e.g., welcomed, attached, bonded), and for some they 
were related to exclusion (e.g., ignored, dumped, abandoned). Sommer and Baumeister 
found that participants who were low in self-esteem (but not those who were high in self­
esteem) rated themselves more negatively following exposure to the ostracism primes.
Previous research has shown that infants and young children are sensitive to some 
aspects of group relations (e.g., Corriveau & Harris, 2009; Kinzler, Dupoux, & Spelke, 
2007; Walker & Andrade, 1996). For example, infants prefer to look at and accept toys 
from individuals who speak their native language (i.e., ingroup members) over 
individuals who speak a different language (i.e., outgroup members) and older children 
prefer native language speakers as friends (Kinzler et al., 2007). Furthermore, research 
using survey-based methods has demonstrated that preschool children can be victims of 
ostracism (Crick, Casas & Ku, 1999; Crick, Casas & Mosher, 1997). However, we do 
not yet know how sensitive young children are to cues indicating social exclusion. In this 
chapter, I attempt to prime ostracism in 5-year-olds. I do so using an even subtler 
manipulation than those used in research on adults: for the first time I prime third-party
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ostracism, and do so using short videos of moving shapes rather than human actors. /
Thus, I also provide a test of just how sensitive humans in general are to social exclusion.
3.1.2 Do children increase their imitation when affiliation is important to them?
Our need to belong to the group has created a profound drive to affiliate with
(:
those around us (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Lakin et al., 2003). For adults at least, this 
drive is closely connected to a tendency to match the behaviour of those around us. In 
one demonstration of this, Lakin and Chartrand (2003) gave adult participants either a 
conscious or a nonconscious goal to affiliate. Participants in the conscious goal condition 
were told that they would later be required to engage in a cooperative task with another 
individual (actually the confederate) and that it would be “very important that the two of 
them get along well”. Participants in the nonsconscious goal condition, on the other 
hand, were primed with a series of words related to affiliation (e.g., affiliate, friend, 
partner and together). After this goal induction, participants watched a video in which 
the confederate performed mundane clerical tasks while repeatedly rubbing her face.
Participants given either type of affiliation goal increased their tendency to mimic the 
mannerisms of the confederate relative to participants in a control group who were not 
given an affiliation goal. There were no significant differences in mimicry between 
participants in the conscious and nonconscious goal conditions.
Lakin et al. (2008) further tested the relation between mimicry and affiliation by 
exposing their participants to ostracism. They reasoned that an experience of social 
exclusion would threaten adults’ belongingness needs and so lead them to seek 
reintegration into the group by engaging in affiliative mimicry. In support of their
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hypothesis, Lakin et al. found that participants who had been excluded from an online 
ball game subsequently mimicked the mannerisms of a conversation partner to a 
significantly greater extent than participants who had been included in the ball game. In 
a related study, Williams et al. (2000) found that participants who were excluded from an 
online ball game were subsequently more likely to conform to the majority opinion in an
I
Asch-style test of conformity than participants who were not excluded. In accordance 
with Lakin et al. (2008), Williams et al. (2000) argue that participants’ conformity was an 
attempt to affiliate with other group members and so re-establish themselves within the 
group.
The extent to which children’s imitation is motivated by social factors has been a 
topic of considerable debate. Previous theory and research has suggested that children’s 
tendency to copy the style with which a model performs an action may sometimes reflect 
a tendency to copy for social reasons (Carpenter, 2006; Carpenter, in press; Nielsen,
2006; Nielsen et al., 2008; Uzgiris, 1981). In support of this hypothesis, Hobson and Lee 
(1999) found that typically developing children, but not children with autism, will 
reproduce the harsh versus gentle style with which a model runs a stick along a pipe rack. 
Further, Nagell et al. (1993) found that, at times, typically developing children will copy 
the specific actions of a model even when it results in less efficient performance on their 
part.
However, the social interpretation of these results is somewhat controversial. 
Other researchers have argued that children’s tendency to copy style can be explained by 
nonsocial factors. According to Lyons et al. (2007), for example, children have a strong 
tendency to encode all of a model’s actions as causally necessary. When they see an
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action which seems causally irrelevant, they revise their implicit understanding of the j  
objects involved in the demonstration accordingly. Consequently they choose to copy 
seemingly irrelevant actions in their imitation. This general standpoint is supported by 
Whiten (in press) who argues that humans have evolved a ‘copy all -  correct/refine later’ 
heuristic which enables them to leam about causally opaque cultural artifacts.
(
Nielsen et al. (2008), however, have provided more direct evidence that children ¥ 
sometimes copy style for social reasons. Nielsen et al. presented 24-month-olds with a 
video demonstration in which a model opened a box using a distinctive and unnecessary 
action style. In one condition, this model communicated with children through a closed 
circuit television link prior to giving the demonstration. In the other condition, the model 
was videotaped and so could not engage in a social interaction with children. Results 
showed that children were significantly more likely to copy the actions of the live, 
interactive, model than the pre-recorded model. Although these data suggest that 
imitation varies according to social factors, the specific nature of the effect is not clear: 
children may have copied the model’s actions more closely in the interactive condition 
either because they sought to affiliate with her or because they liked her more.
In this chapter, I describe an experiment in which the model’s behaviour is held 
constant and the children’s own goals within the situation are manipulated across 
conditions. This paradigm allows us to ascertain whether children increase their 
imitation when affiliation is important to them.
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3.2 The current experiment /
Thus, in the current experiment, I had two main aims. My first aim was to 
investigate aspects of the need to belong by testing just how sensitive young children are 
to ostracism. My second aim was to look for links between ostracism and affiliative
imitation in children and, in doing so, test whether children’s imitation is influenced by
/'
the drive to affiliate. <
In order to investigate these two questions, I primed children with a very minimal 
display of ostracism -  two short videos in which one shape was excluded by a group of 
other shapes -  and measured the effect of this prime on children’s subsequent imitation of 
a model’s exact behaviours. I chose to test these predictions with 5-year-olds. As 5-year- 
olds spend considerable time interacting with friends and peer groups, they may have 
already experienced social exclusion (Crick et al., 1999; Bamer-Barey, 1986) and so have 
developed behavioural strategies to compensate for its negative effects.
3.2.1 Method
Participants
Participants were 28 children between the ages of five and six years {mean age =
5 years, 5 months). Seventeen of the children were female and 11 male. An additional 
two children were tested but excluded from the data set; one as a result of equipment 
failure and one for failure to pay attention during presentation of the videos. All children 
were native German speakers and were recruited from a number of kindergartens in the 
Leipzig area, after their parents had given permission for them to participate in child 
development studies.
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Design and Materials j
Children were randomly assigned to one of two conditions in a between-subjects 
design. Depending on the condition, they observed either two videos depicting ostracism 
or two control videos. After observing the videos, each child participated in an imitation 
task. ,
ftDuring the experiment, children sat on the floor on a small blue mat placed 
approximately 80cm from the experimenter and 25cm from a laptop computer. The 
laptop sat on a small chair so that the screen was approximately eye-level for the 
children. The priming stimuli were created using the ‘custom animation’ function in 
PowerPoint and were presented on a Macbook with a 13 inch screen, the resolution of 
which was 1280 x 800 pixels.
The priming stimuli in each condition consisted of two short videos played 
consecutively. The scenarios in the videos were inspired by the classic Heider and 
Simmel (1944) movies which cause both adults and children to attribute social intentions 
to the movements of geometric shapes (see, for example, Abell, Happe, & Frith, 2000). 
Each video depicted four shapes moving around the screen (blue pentagons in the first 
video, and green, horizontal teardrop shapes in the second video). These shapes did not 
have facial features, nor did they speak or make any sounds during the videos. Each of 
the videos was rated by three adult observers (blind to the purpose of the experiment), all 
of whom interpreted the ostracism videos, but not the control videos, as depicting social 
exclusion. The movements made by the shapes during each video were as follows (see 
also Figure 3.1).
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In the first /ideo in the ostracism condition, three pentagons entered the scene and 
appeared to play together as a group. After a short delay, a fourth pentagon entered the 
scene and approached the group. The three pentagons moved away from the fourth shape 
on four separate occasions in a series of moves which suggested its exclusion from their 
group. In the final section of the video, the fourth shape gave up its attempts at inclusion, 
moved away from the group, and came to a halt at the far side of the screen.
In the second video in the ostracism condition, two teardrop shaped objects 
entered the scene and appeared to play ball together. After a short delay, a third object 
(with the same shape) entered the scene and tried to join the game. The two shapes 
refused to pass the ball to the third object, but passed it between themselves a further 
three times. Subsequent to this, the two shapes abandoned their game and moved away 
from the third object. The third object then made two more attempts to join the two 
shapes but was rebuffed both times. As in the first video, the scene ended with the 
rejected object moving away from the group and coming to a halt at the far side of the 
screen.
Children’s behaviour in the ostracism condition was compared to their behaviour 
in a baseline control condition in which the videos were very similar to those in the 
ostracism condition, but did not involve any social exclusion. Critically, the actions 
made by the group were identical in both conditions. This meant that both the ostracism 
videos and the control videos contained equivalent information about affiliation, but only 
the ostracism video contained additional information about social exclusion. In each of 
the two control videos, the rejected object was replaced by a different type of object, one 
that was less likely to be seen as being socially excluded. Instead of attempting to be
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included in the group, this object (a blue, fly-like object in the pentagon videos and a 
green, butterfly-like object in the ball game videos) made random movements around the 
screen. This object was approximately the same size and colour as the rejected object in 
the ostracism condition and the number of movements it made was matched to the 
movements made by the rejected object. Social contingency was also held constant
for further details).
It is worth noting that it was surprisingly difficult to come up with a control 
condition that adult observers did not see as suggesting ostracism while, at the same time, 
retaining the basic features of the videos from the ostracism condition. In my first 
attempt, I kept the group’s movements constant and made the individual shape follow a 
different, random path instead of repeatedly approaching the group. However, adult 
observers still interpreted the videos in terms of social exclusion. In my second attempt, I 
changed the identity of the individual shape to something that might be seen as moving 
around with no social relationship to the group: a butterfly or fly. I attempted to match 
the movement of this new shape to that of the rejected shape in the ostracism condition 
but, again, adult observers described the scenarios in terms of social exclusion. The 
sensitivity of the adult raters to even the slightest cues suggesting social exclusion meant 
that it was necessary to manipulate both the identity of the relevant shape and the 
movements it made around the screen. An alternative possibility might have been to 
delete the rejected shape from the control video completely, leaving only the actions of 
the group. However, this would have been a relatively weak control as both the total
across conditions: every time the group moved, this object moved^as well (see Figure 3.1
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numbei/ of movements and the number of socially contingent movements made by the 
shapes would have varied across conditions.
Ostracism Condition Control Condition
0-13 secs: Two shapes erter and play ban 
together They pass the ball to each other 
three times
14 secs: A third shape enters and toes to join 
them
15-29 secs: The two shapes pass the ball to 
each other three more times, but refuse to 
pass it to the third shape
29 secs: The two shapes abandon their game 
and move away from the rejected shape
30-40 secs: The rejected shape makes three 
attempts to join them, but each time they ignore 
it and move away
42-45 secs: The rejected shape gives up and moves 
away from the other two shapes
0-13 secs: Two shapes enter and play bal 
together They pass toe trail to each other 
three times
14 secs A butterfly enters the scene
15-29 secs: The two shapes pass the ball to 
each other three more times, paying no attention 
to the butterfly
29 secs: The two shapes abandon their game and 
move across the screen
30-40 secs: The butterfly moves across the screen 
three times Each time the butterfly moves, the 
shapes move
42-45 secs: The bitterfly moves to the bottom lett 
hand side of the screen, and stops in the same 
location as the rejected shape in the ostracism 
condition
Figure 3.1. Summary of Events in the Ball Game scenario. The left hand panel shows 
events in the Ostracism Condition and the right hand panel shows events in the Control 
Condition.
In addition to these videos, a final 30-second video depicting seven shapes 
playing together was shown to each child at the end of the test session (subsequent to the 
imitation task). This video did not form part of the manipulation; its sole purpose was to 
alleviate any negative feelings which may have been induced by the ostracism videos 
(and to model inclusive behaviour to children).
81
I
The box on which the imitation task was performed/was made from clear Perspex 
and was 20cm x 30cm x 30cm in size. When the top of the box was pressed, an orange 
light inside the box lit up and spun around (see Figure 3.2). In addition to the box, three 
wooden tools -  cylindrical sticks -  were provided for the imitation task. Each of these 
tools was 15cm in length. One half o f each of these tools was coloured (blue, green or
I
red) and the other half was black. I
Figure 3.2. The materials for the imitation task: The light box on which the task was 
performed and, to the right, the three wooden tools provided for the task.
Procedure
Testing was conducted by an experimenter (E) who was blind to the hypothesis of 
the experiment, the content o f the videos, and the condition to which each child had been 
assigned. E invited children individually into a quiet room in their kindergarten and 
asked them to sit opposite her on a small mat. After an initial warm-up phase which 
involved drawing pictures and answering questions (identical in both conditions), E told 
children she needed to read something, but that they could watch a video while she did. 
Throughout the test session the laptop screen was orientated away from E so that she
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I could not see the content of the videos. It was therefore necessary for a second
experimenter to activate the videos. This second experimenter, sitting unobtrusively in 
the comer of the room, surreptitiously activated the video via remote control. The two 
videos were played consecutively, always in the same order: first the pentagons followed 
by the ball game. The ball game video started automatically, as soon as the pentagons 
video was complete. After the videos were finished, as indicated by a soft click, E put 
down her magazine, brought out the light box, and said to children, “Oh, your video has 
ended, then I’ll show you my new toy,” after which she proceeded to act on the box. The 
demonstration consisted of 8 components: first E chose the green tool from among the set 
of three coloured tools (1). After choosing this tool, she rolled it between her hands 
several times (2). She then rotated the tool in her hands such that the black end was 
facing towards the floor (3), and grasped it in her right fist (4). Subsequent to this, she 
held the tool vertically (5) and dragged it (6) three times (7) along the lid of the box, 
always in the same direction (8): making a line from the comer of the box closest to the 
child to the comer of the box closest to her own body, each time turning on the light. E 
always looked at the child at the start of the demonstration, but when she was acting on 
the box she looked only at the apparatus. After the demonstration was complete, E 
looked up at the child, pushed the box and the three tools towards the child, and said, 
“Now you.” The response phase lasted until the child had finished acting on the box. 
After the response phase was complete, E asked the child to watch the final video in 
which seven shapes played together.
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Coding j
Children’s responses were coded from videotape. Each child was given a score 
between 0 and 8 depending on how many components of the demonstration they 
reproduced (see Table 3.1 for scoring procedures). Data from 6 children (21% of the data 
set) were independently coded in order to assess inter-rater reliability. The second coder
Iwas blind to the hypothesis of the experiment, the content of the videos, and the condition 
to which each child had been assigned. Agreement between the two coders was 100%, 
Cohen’s Kappa = 1.
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Table 3.1. Description o f  each component o f  the demonstration and the percentage o f
children in each condition who reproduced it.
Component 
of action
Description o f model's 
behavior
Operational criteria 
for a correct response
Percentage o f children 
who reproduc ed the 
action component
Ostracism
condition
Control
condition
1. Tool 
choice
E chooses the green 
tool.
The first tool P uses 
to operate the box is 
green.
28.6 28.6
2. Roll tool E rolls the tool between 
her hands before using 
it to operate the box.
P rolls the tool 
between his/her 
hands at any point 
during the response 
phase.
78.6 50.0
3. Tool 
orientation
E rotates the tool to use 
the black part to contact 
the box
P uses the black part 
of the tool to contact 
the box at any point 
during the response 
phase.
92.9 71.4
4. Tool grip E holds the tool in her 
fist.
P contacts the box 
while grasping the 
tool in his/her fist at 
any point during the 
response phase.
92.9 78.6
5. Tool 
angle
E holds the tool 
perpendicular to the 
box.
P holds the tool at an 
angle which is within 
10° of vertical while 
contacting the box at 
any point during the 
response period.
100 100
6. Drag 
tool
E drags the tool along 
die box such that the 
tool moves 
approximately 10cm 
across the lid.
P drags the tool more 
than 3cm along the 
lid at any point 
during the response 
phase.
92.9 78.6
7. Number 
of touches
E uses the tool to 
activate the box a total 
of 3 times.
P makes exactly 3 
attempts to activate 
the light inside the 
box.
35.7 21.4
8 Line of  
touches
E's three actions make a 
line along the box such 
that her first action is 
closest to P and her last 
action is closest to 
herself.
P’s actions on the box 
form a line either 
travelling from 
himself/herself to E 
or vice versa.
28.6 21.4
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3.2.2 Results j
Figure 3.3 indicates the mean imitation score of children in the ostracism and 
control conditions. As predicted, children in the ostracism condition reproduced 
significantly more components of the demonstration than children in the control 
condition (t(26)= 3.02, two-tailed j?= .006, rYA.=. 51). An inspection of the individual 
components revealed that this effect was not driven by a tendency to reproduce any 
particular element from the demonstration (see Table 3.1).
Ostracism Control
Condition
Figure 3.3. The mean number of components from the demonstration that children 
reproduced in the ostracism and control conditions. Errors bars represent + 1 SE, * 
indicates a statistically significant difference.
It is important to note that almost all children -  13 out of 14 in the ostracism 
condition, and 12 out of 14 in the control condition -  succeeded in turning on the light at 
least once, and there was no difference in this measure between conditions (j^(l)=0.37,
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p=.54). The remaining three children all showed a clear attempt to turn on the light.
Thus, children in both conditions were equally motivated to act on the light box and 
interested in the imitation task, but children in the ostracism condition copied E’s specific 
actions more closely than children in the control condition.
The present experiment investigated whether children increase their affiliative 
behaviour following indirect exposure to social exclusion. Results showed that children 
primed with ostracism imitated the actions of a model significantly more closely than 
children given a neutral prime. Interestingly, however, children in the two conditions did 
not differ in their tendency to turn on the light -  every child did, or attempted to do this. It 
is thus possible to conclude that, from relatively early in development, the need to belong 
exerts a powerful influence on children’s social behaviour, leading them to increase their 
imitation in response to surprisingly subtle cues indicating exclusion from the group.
These results represent the first demonstration that it is possible to prime 
ostracism in children. Perhaps especially striking is the fact that the prime was composed 
of a scene in which a third party was ostracised. This is a contrast to paradigms used 
with adults in which participants have always experienced ostracism directly; for 
example, by exclusion from a ball game, or an online chat (e.g., Lakin et al., 2008; 
Williams et al., 2000; Williams & Sommer, 1997). Moreover, the children in this 
experiment did not even experience human actors being ostracised, with all of the 
emotional and other cues that might be present in such a display. Instead they were 
primed with short videos in which a small shape appeared to be excluded from a group of
3.2.3 Discussion
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other shapes. These shapes did not have facial features, nor did they talk, or make any 
sounds throughout the videos. Humans, it seems, are so sensitive to the possibility of 
social exclusion that the mere hint that an object is being excluded from a group (even if 
that object is only a moving shape) is sufficient to impact upon their social behaviour.
Furthermore, these results provide strong evidence that imitation performs aI
social function in development. This finding accords with previous research suggesting 
that imitation varies according to social factors (e.g., Nielsen, 2006; Nielsen et al., 2008). 
It goes beyond previous findings in demonstrating that children increase their imitation 
when affiliation is important to them. Consequently, the present research also has 
important implications for our understanding o f the relationship between nonconscious 
mimicry in adults and imitation of style in children. Previous theory and research has 
suggested that both forms of copying behaviour are related to affiliation (Carpenter,
2006; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Nielsen, 2006; Uzgiris, 1981). This research goes 
beyond that and shows (together with Lakin et al., 2008) that both forms of copying 
behaviour vary according to the same social factor: ostracism. It would be interesting for 
future research to investigate more fully the similarities and differences between both 
forms of copying behaviour, as well as their developmental origins and trajectories.
An unanswered question remains, however: through what means did the ostracism 
prime lead to increased imitation? One possibility is that the children who received the 
ostracism prime used imitation strategically in order to ingratiate themselves with another 
group member (see Lakin et al., 2008). According to this interpretation, the ostracism 
prime induced a goal to affiliate, which in turn led children to imitate the actions of the 
model more closely, presumably in an attempt to communicate their similarity to her
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(Uzgiris, 1981, 1984). A second possibility is that the ostracism prime altere^ the way in 
which children processed incoming social information, and so affected their imitation. 
Previous research has demonstrated that an experience of ostracism enhances recall of 
social information. For example, Gardner, Pickett, and Brewer (2000) found that, after 
being excluded from an online chat, adult participants recalled significantly more social
'(j
information from a series of diary entries than participants who had been included in the 
chat. Gardner et al. (2000) interpreted this result as evidence that an experience of social 
exclusion creates a sort ‘social hunger’ which leads people to increase their attention to, 
and recall of, social information. In the context of this experiment, it is possible that 
children who observed the ostracism prime noticed and/or recalled more aspects of the 
demonstration than children given the neutral prime, and this led them to reproduce the 
model’s actions more precisely (see also Wilkowski, Robinson, & Friesen, 2009). These 
two interpretations are not mutually exclusive and, in theory, could even operate in 
parallel, but further research would be needed to determine the relative influence of the 
two factors.
In summary, this experiment, along with related research, contributes important 
information to our understanding of the basic human need to belong. Previous research 
has demonstrated that, even as young children, we prefer members of our ingroup 
(Kinzler et al., 2007) and conform to the opinions of those around us (Corriveau &
Harris, 2009; Walker & Andrade, 1996). This experiment goes beyond previous research 
in demonstrating that, even as children, we are incredibly sensitive to cues which indicate 
our exclusion from the group. Furthermore, we are able to use behavioural strategies
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such as imitation in order to affiliate with those around us and so re-establish our position 
within the group.
3.3 Suggestions for future research
3.3.1 What is the relationship between imitation of style and nonconscious mimicry?
{
In this experiment, I attempted to draw parallels between children’s tendency to 
copy the style with which a model performs an action and adults’ tendency to 
subconsciously mimic the mannerisms of their conversation partners. In future research, 
it would be interesting to further investigate the similarities and differences between these 
two forms of copying behaviour. The first priority for future research would be to 
investigate when in development children begin to subconsciously mimic the mannerisms 
of their conversation partners.
In an initial attempt to answer this question, I conducted a small pilot study in 
which I tested whether observing ostracism primes would increase 5-year-old children’s 
tendency to mimic the mannerisms of a model. In this pilot study, eleven 5-year-olds 
watched either the ostracism videos or the control videos from the experiment outlined 
above. Subsequent to this, a model engaged the children in conversation, asking them a 
series of questions about their family and daily lives. During this conversation, the model 
repeatedly touched her face (as in the experiments of Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). I 
compared the amount of time children spent touching their faces during this test period to 
the amount of time they spent touching their face in a baseline period before observing 
the videos. Results showed no main effect of condition and no condition x time period
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interaction. That is, in neither condition did children increase to touch
their faces above baseline levels.
Naturally this null result is difficult to interpret. One interpretation is that 
children do not mimic the mannerisms of their conversation partners. This interpretation 
is compatible with previous research suggesting that children do not engage in some
example, found that children are not susceptible to contagious yawning until they are 5- 
or 6-years-old (Anderson & Meno, 2003). However, in other respects this null result is 
surprising, especially considering that some researchers have claimed that children’s 
tendency to copy style is based on the same cognitive mechanism as adults’ tendency to 
mimic the mannerisms of their conversation partners (e.g., Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001; 
Heyes, 2001). In future research, it would be informative to test children’s capacity for 
nonconscious mimicry in a wider range of situations and using a wider range of target 
behaviours.
If it were possible to find subconscious mimicry in children, it would be 
interesting to explore whether children who have a strong tendency to mimic also have a 
strong tendency to copy the style with which a model performs an action. In addition to 
investigating these basic individual differences, it would be interesting to investigate the 
developmental emergence of these different forms of behaviour matching and explore 
how they relate to the emergence of other affiliative behaviours in childhood.
forms of mimicry until relatively late in development. Anderson and Meno (2003), for
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3.3^2 Is children’s social imitation communicative?
In the experiment described in this chapter, I demonstrated that children increase 
their imitation when affiliation is important to them. However, it is not clear whether the 
children were using imitation as a means by which to communicate with the model or 
whether the increase in imitation was more automatic. In future research, it would be
I
interesting to investigate whether children use imitation as a form of communication with 
a social partner, in order to convey the message ‘I am like you’ (see Carpenter, 2006; 
Carpenter, in press).
One means by which to test this question would be to manipulate the visual 
availability of children’s social partner within an imitative interaction. In a previous 
study with adults, Bavelas, Black, Lemery and Mullett (1986) found that participants 
were significantly more likely to mimic the pained expression of an experimenter if that 
experimenter was looking at them as they received their apparent injury. In future 
research, it would be interesting to apply a similar paradigm to research with children. If 
children use imitation as a means by which to communicate social information, then they 
should monitor the effects of their imitation on their social partner. Thus they should 
only copy their partner’s specific when their social partner is looking at them.
3.3.3 When does affiliative imitation emerge in development?
In future research, it would be interesting to investigate at what age affiliative 
imitation emerges. We know from previous research that infants start to copy the style 
with which a model performs an action from around 12 months. In a longitudinal study, 
Over et al. (2009) presented 6- 9- and 12-month-old infants with demonstrations in which
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a model performed a series of instrumental actions usi^ig a distinctive action style, for 
example, turning on a light using her fist rather than the palm of her hand. Results 
showed that 12-month-olds copied the style with which the model performed the action 
in this experimental condition but not in a manipulation control condition. Six and 9- 
month-old infants, on the other hand, showed no tendency to copy the style with which
I
the model performed the action. These data suggest that affiliative imitation may emerge 
as early as 12 months.
However, infants in this study may have been copying style for non-social reasons 
(see Lyons et al., 2007; Whiten, in press). In future research it would be interesting to 
manipulate infants’ social goals within an experiment such as this and measure the 
impact upon their imitation. It is important to note, however, that ostracism primes may 
not be suitable for infants as, by 12 months, they have not yet experienced social 
exclusion from groups. As we shall see in the next chapter, however, it might be 
informative to use more straightforward affiliation primes with infants.
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Chapter 4 
Unintentional Behaviour Matching: Do Eighteen-Month-Old Infants 
Show Increased Helping Following Priming with Affiliation?
4.1 Introduction
In my General Introduction, I argued that, in addition to explicit behaviour 
matching, adults also show a tendency to subconsciously assimilate their behaviour to 
social primes. The theme of social priming was reintroduced in the previous chapter, and 
is further developed here. The experiment I describe in this chapter had two goals. My 
first goal was to test whether even infants are susceptible to the influence of social 
primes. My second goal was to explore aspects of affiliation in early development. More 
specifically, I aimed to test whether the connections between affiliation and prosocial 
behaviour are so fundamental that they are seen even in infants.
4.1.1 Unintentional social influence
In my General Introduction (and the following two chapters), I discussed a large 
body of research aimed at investigating the goals underlying social influence. I argued 
that imitation (and indeed behaviour matching more generally) is motivated by goals to 
learn from, and affiliate with, others. However, social psychologists have demonstrated 
that internally generated goals are not always the primary cause of our behaviour (Bargh, 
2006, 2008). Social priming research has shown that goals and other mental 
representations can be more or less directly produced by the environment (Bargh, 2006, 
2008). The environmental activation of these internal mental representations leads to
I
changes in our social behaviour without th^/ formation of conscious intentions to act 
(Bargh, 2008).
In one of the first demonstrations of behavioural priming effects, Bargh et al. 
(1996) investigated the impact of priming social concepts on subsequent social 
behaviour. In order to do this, Bargh et jd. presented adult participants with a scrambled 
sentence task in which some of the words were either related to the trait concept of 
rudeness (e.g., intrude, bother, aggressively) or to the trait concept of politeness (e.g., 
patiently, cordially, sensitively). Subsequent to this priming manipulation, Bargh et al. 
measured how long it would take participants to interrupt an ongoing conversation 
between the experimenter and a confederate. Results showed that participants primed 
with the concept or rudeness interrupted the conversation significantly more quickly than 
participants primed with the concept of politeness. A funnelled debriefing demonstrated 
that participants were unaware of the connection between the priming manipulation and 
their subsequent behaviour.
In another study, Bargh et al. (1996) found that subtle activation of social 
stereotypes could also influence behaviour. In this experiment, Bargh et al. presented 
participants with a scrambled sentence task which either contained words related to the 
stereotype of the elderly (e.g., old, lonely, grey) or not (e.g., thirsty, private, clean) and 
measured the impact on their walking speed. Results showed that participants primed 
with the stereotype of the elderly subsequently walked more slowly down the corridor 
than participants given the neutral prime. Importantly, this effect occurred even though 
the prime words themselves did not contain any reference to the trait of slowness. Once
I
again, a funnelled debriefing suggested that participants were unaware of the connection j
between the primes and their subsequent behaviour.
In further research, Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Bamdollar and Trotschel (2001) 
investigated whether priming goals influences social behaviour. They demonstrated that 
participants who had been surreptitiously presented with words related to the goal of
I
achievement (e.g., succeed, compete, win) were more successful in a word search puzzle < 
than participants who had been given a neutral prime. A second experiment showed that 
participants who had been primed with words related to the goal of cooperation (e.g., 
honest, cooperative, fair) replenished a commonly held resource within a computerised 
fishing game more willing than participants given a neutral prime. Furthermore, there 
were no significant differences in cooperation between participants who had been primed 
with the goal to cooperate and participants in another condition who had made an explicit 
commitment to that goal.
Priming research has thus demonstrated that very subtle cues in the environment 
are sufficient to modify adult’s social behaviour. Reading a few words related to the 
elderly is sufficient to lead participants to walk more slowly down the corridor (Bargh et 
al., 1996) and reading a few words related to cooperation is sufficient to make 
participants more cooperative (Bargh et al., 2001). Although an impressive number of 
priming effects have been catalogued in adults, we know very little about the influence of 
social primes on young children. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated that priming 
ostracism increases affiliative imitation in 5-year-olds. My first aim in this chapter was 
to test whether even infants are susceptible to the influence of social primes.
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4.1.2 Affiliation and prosocial behaviour in infancy
Social priming is an interesting phenomenon in its own right, but it is also a useful 
method by which to investigate the relations between goals and other mental 
representations and behavioural responses (see Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Lakin and 
Chartrand (2003), for example, used priming as a means by which to explore the 
connections between mimicry and affiliation. By priming words related to affiliation, 
they were able to ascertain that adults increase their behavioural mimicry when affiliation 
is important to them. Similarly, in the previous chapter, I used priming in order to show 
that children’s tendency to copy the style with which a model performs an action is also 
motivated by affiliation goals. In this chapter, I use social priming as a means to explore 
aspects of affiliation in infancy.
Compared to research in adults, we know very little about the role of affiliation in 
infancy. In my General Introduction, I presented some indirect evidence that affiliation 
may play a role in early development. For example, Lizskowski et al. (2004) 
demonstrated that 12-month-old infants point in order to share attention and interest with 
a social partner. Although this experiment was not designed to test the existence of 
affiliation goals in infancy, the behaviour it revealed can be interpreted as affiliative. 
Another example of a behaviour which has been interpreted as affiliative is imitation. 
Over et al. (2009) demonstrated that from 12 months of age, infants go beyond copying 
the actions which are necessary to reproduce the same end result as a model and copy the 
specific style she used in producing the action. Again, this experiment was not designed 
to test for the presence of affiliation goals in infancy, but the behaviour it reveals can be 
viewed as affiliative (see Carpenter, 2006).
97
I
Another behaviour which could be related to affiliation is helping. Helping js a 
particularly interesting behaviour because, unlike affiliative behaviours such as imitation, 
it incurs a cost. In order to be helpful, an individual must sacrifice time and resources in 
pursuit of another’s survival (Trivers, 1971). Although this behaviour seems puzzling 
from an evolutionary perspective (see Sober & Wilson, 1998), researchers have ,
I
postulated that there are a number of reasons why we help those around us. As adults, we 
help others in order to gain personal rewards and avoid punishments (e.g. Bar-Tal, 1982; 
Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006), to maintain or create positive mood states 
(e.g. Snyder & Omoto, 1992), to uphold moral standards (e.g. Fiske, 2004) and in the 
hope that those we help will reciprocate later (Trivers, 1971). In addition to these 
motives, it appears that our tendency to help is related to affiliation; we are helpful in 
order to create and maintain social bonds with those around us (Baumeister & Leary,
1995). Evidence in favour of this proposal comes from studies suggesting that we are 
significantly more likely to help people we know, and people we consider similar to 
ourselves, such as ingroup members (Baumeister & Leary, 1995).
Research has shown that infants are also willing to help those around them. 
Wameken and Tomasello (2006) presented 18-month-old infants with a series of 
situations in which an experimenter needed help, for example, in order to reach an object 
he had dropped. Infants’ behaviour in these scenarios were compared to control tasks in 
which the experimenter performed similar actions, but did not need help in order to 
achieve his goal. For example, the experimenter deliberately dropped an object on the 
floor. Results showed that infants helped the experimenter (for example, by picking up
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the dropped object ai/d offering it to him) significantly more often in the experimental 
condition than in the control condition.
Infants’ tendency to help is now well established (see, for example, Wameken, 
Hare, Melis, Hanus, & Tomasello, 2007; Wameken & Tomasello, 2007; Wameken & 
Tomasello, 2008)., However, the motivations underlying this behaviour are not yet well
'ii
understood. One possibility is that infants’ tendency to be helpful is influenced by 
affiliation. Recent research using a looking-time measure has suggested that one-year- 
old infants associate helping behaviour with affiliation. Kuhlmeier, Wynn and Bloom 
(2003), for example, tested 12-month-old infants’ understanding of helping and affiliation 
through the use of a habituation paradigm. In order to do this, Kuhlmeier et al. created 
habituation videos in which one shape (for example, a yellow triangle) helped another 
shape (a red circle) up a hill. A third shape (a blue square), on the other hand, hindered 
the red circle’s ascent up the hill. In the test videos, the red circle either moved next to 
the helper shape or the hinderer shape. When adults were asked to explain these test 
videos, they interpreted the scene in which the red circle moved towards the helper shape 
as a coherent continuation of the previous video. They described this test video in terms 
of affiliation, claiming that the red circle preferred the helper to the hinderer. Results 
from the habituation experiment suggested that infants may have interpreted the videos in 
the same way: infants were surprised when the red circle moved towards the hinderer, but 
not when it moved towards the helper shape. Hamlin et al. (2007) recently found a 
similar pattern of results with 10-month-olds. Although these results suggest that infants 
have some understanding of the connection between affiliation (in the form of physical
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proximity) and helping, we do not yet know whether infants increase the^r own tendency 
to help when affiliation is important to them.
Consequently, my second aim in this chapter was to investigate the connections 
between affiliation and helping behaviour in infancy. In order to do this, I manipulated 
the presence of affiliation information and measured the impact on injants’ tendency to 
be helpful. I
4.2 The current experiment
I had two aims in the current experiment. My first aim was to test whether even
infants are susceptible to the influence of social primes. My second aim was to 
investigate whether infants increase their helping behaviour when affiliation is important 
to them.
I thus primed 18-month-old infants with photographs evoking affiliation (two 
small dolls standing next to each other in the background of photographs of other objects) 
and measured the influence of the primes on infants’ tendency to be helpful. Infants’ 
helping responses in this ‘together’ prime condition was compared to their responses in 
three other conditions. First, the together condition was compared to a condition in 
which infants were primed with individuality or ‘aloneness’. In this condition, infants 
saw a single doll standing in the background of otherwise identical photographs. If there 
are connections between affiliation and helping, then infants primed with two dolls 
should be more likely to later help an experimenter than infants primed with one doll 
standing alone. Second, in order to test whether affiliation primes increase helping (or 
individual primes decrease it), the together condition was compared to a measure of 
infants’ baseline tendency to help: a condition in which the doll primes were replaced
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with two ij/eutral, nonsocial stimuli, small stacks of blocks. Finally, in order to determine 
which aspect of the affiliation primes increase helpfulness, the together condition was 
compared to a condition in which there were also two dolls, but this time standing in a 
non-affiliative relation to each other: back-to-back. This condition was designed to 
determine whether it is the mere presence of two dolls or their affiliative interaction that 
increases helpfulness.
4.2.1 Method
Participants
Participants were 60 infants between the ages of 18 months, 0 days and 18 
months, 29 days. Thirty three of these infants were female and 27 were male.
Participants were recruited from a database of parents living in the Leipzig area who had 
expressed an interest in participating in child development studies. Fifteen infants were 
randomly assigned to each condition. An additional 7 infants were tested but excluded 
from analyses for parental interference («=3), crying during the test (n= 2), experimenter 
error (n=\), and refusal to observe the photographs (w=l).
Design and materials
Infants were shown one of four sets of eight colour photographs which were 28.5 
x 19cm in size. Each of these photographs contained a familiar household object (e.g., a 
teapot, a book, or a shoe) and a prime. In each case, the household object appeared in the 
foreground of the photograph and the prime appeared in the background. In the together 
condition, each prime consisted of two small wooden dolls facing each other in close 
proximity. In the alone condition, each prime consisted of a single wooden doll standing
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by itself. In the baseline condition, each prime consisted of tyo small stacks of blocks 
roughly the same size as the dolls, and in the back-to-back condition, each prime 
consisted of two wooden dolls facing in opposite directions (see Figure 4.1 for an 
example from each condition).
The eight photographs were identical in the four conditions except for the primes, 
and were presented in the same order for all infants. In half of the photographs, the prime 
appeared to the right of the foreground object and in the other half, to the left. Within the 
together condition, various combinations of dolls were used, with each pair being drawn 
from a possible set of six dolls. Within the alone condition, two sets of photographs were 
used: for any given picture, half of infants saw the doll from the right side of the together 
picture, and half of infants saw the doll from the left side of the together picture. Within 
the baseline condition, each photograph contained a unique configuration of four 
coloured blocks. Finally, within the back-to-back condition, each photograph contained 
the same dolls as in the together condition but rotated so that they faced away from each 
other. Importantly, the same proportion of the dolls’ facial features was visible in the 
together and back-to-back conditions.
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bFigure 4.1. The stimuli in each condition. A sample photograph from the a) together 
condition, b) alone condition, c) baseline condition, and d) back-to-back condition.
In order to assess infants’ mood, immediately after the presentation of the primes, 
parents were asked to complete a mood evaluation consisting of three scales: happy-sad, 
good-bad, and cheerful-gloomy. Scores on each scale ranged from 0 (negative) - 7 
(positive) (scale adapted from van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 
2004).
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Procedure j
After a brief warm-up play phase with both experimenters, which was identical in 
all conditions, E2 showed each of the photographs in turn to the infant following a 
predefined script. For each photograph, E2 named the foreground object and then 
commented on its colour and finally its function, completely ignoring the prime. During
I
this time, El sat in the opposite comer of the room, with her back to the interaction, 
reading (this ensured that she was unaware of the condition to which the infant had been 
assigned). After the presentation of the photographs, E2 asked the infant to play with El 
and turned away from the interaction to read. El then briefly left the room and returned 
with a bundle of six small sticks which she ‘accidentally’ dropped on the floor while 
kneeling down at a small table (for a similar helping task see MacCrae & Johnston,
1998). To give the infant the opportunity to help spontaneously, during the first 10 
seconds after dropping the sticks El said nothing, just alternated her gaze between the 
fallen sticks and the infant’s face. During the next 10 seconds, if the infant had not 
already begun helping, El looked towards them, called their name and said, “My sticks, 
they’ve fallen on the floor,” then made two unsuccessful attempts to reach the sticks 
herself. During the next 10 seconds, El looked at the infant, called their name and said, 
“My sticks, I need them back,” and made two more attempts to reach the sticks. During 
the final 10 seconds, El looked at the infant, said, “Please will you help me?” and held 
out her hand, palm up.
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Coding
The main dependent measure was whether infants helped El spontaneously, that 
is whether they picked up at least one stick and offered it to her within the first 10 
seconds of the test phase (before she either spoke to infants or reached for the sticks 
herself). In addition, a more general measure of helping was scored if infants picked up 
at least one stick and offered it to El at any point during the test phase (i.e., including 
after El asked for help). To assess interrater reliability, a randomly-chosen 20% of the 
videotapes were scored independently by a rater blind to condition and experimental 
hypothesis. Agreement was perfect for both measures (Cohen’s Kappas = 1.00).
4.2.2 Results
Main analyses
Figure 4.2 presents the percentage of infants who helped El spontaneously 
(within the first 10 seconds of the test phase) in each of the four conditions. Three times 
as many infants helped spontaneously in the together condition as in each of the other 
three conditions. As the percentage of infants who helped in the three control conditions 
was identical, and the expected values in the 2 x 4  contingency table were low, the data 
from these three conditions was pooled and then compared to the together condition. 
Infants were significantly more likely to spontaneously help El in the together condition 
than in the pooled control conditions (^2(1)=8.57, two-tailedp=.003, phi= .38).
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Figure 4.2. The percentage of infants who helped El spontaneously (in the first 10 
seconds) in the four conditions.
Figure 4.3 presents the percentage o f infants in each condition who helped El at 
any point during the test phase (i.e., including after El asked for help) in each of the four 
conditions. Again infants were significantly more likely to help in the together condition 
than in the pooled control conditions 0^(1)= 6.43, two-tailedp=.0\\,phi=33). There 
were no significant differences between the three control conditions (^(2)=.18,/7=.91).
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Figure 4.3. The percentage of infants who helped E l at any point during the test phase in 
the four conditions.
Other measures
In order to ascertain whether infants paid equal attention to the presentation of the 
primes in the four conditions, a third of the infants from each condition were randomly 
selected and the number of seconds they spent looking at the photographs was coded. 
There were no significant differences between conditions (F(3, 16)=1.58,/?=.23). The 
average number o f seconds spent looking at the photographs was 102.2 in the together 
condition, 92.8 in the alone condition, 89.6 in the baseline condition, and 101.4 in the 
back-to-back condition.
There were also no significant differences in infants’ mood across the four 
conditions (F(3, 56)=.155,/?=.93). The average rating o f infants’ mood was 5.04 in the 
together condition, 4.97 in the alone condition, 5.0 in the baseline condition, and 5.27 in
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the back-to-back condition. /Thus, infants’ increased helping in the together condition 
cannot be explained by differences in attentiveness or a more positive mood.
4.2.3 Discussion
After having been exposed to affiliative primes, 18-month-old infants were three 
times as likely to spontaneously help an adult as after having been exposed to individual 
primes. By comparing the results of the together condition to the baseline control 
condition, it is possible to conclude that it was the together condition which increased 
helping behaviour rather than the alone condition which decreased it. Moreover, by 
comparing the results of the together condition to the back-to-back condition, it is 
possible to conclude that it was the affiliative stance depicted in the photographs, rather 
than the mere presence of two dolls that increased helping.
One possible objection to this account is that the rates of helping in the baseline 
control condition are somewhat lower than those reported in a previous helping 
experiment with 18-month-olds (Wameken & Tomasello, 2006). This raises the 
possibility that the together condition represents a true baseline and the other three 
conditions depressed helping below baseline levels. However, a direct comparison 
between these two experiments is complicated by some important differences in the 
procedures. For example, in Wameken and Tomasello (2006), infants were presented 
with many different helping tasks (and several trials within each task). They had also 
been interacting with the experimenter who needed help immediately prior to the test 
phase. In contrast, infants in this experiment were presented with only one chance to 
help, and had been interacting with a different experimenter immediately prior to the test 
phase, which is likely to have reduced their tendency to help across all four conditions.
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Thus, the pattern of results across the different conditions is more informative tlj(an a 
comparison across experiments.
These results are the first to demonstrate that infants are susceptible to the 
influence of social primes. Previous research with adults has shown that very subtle cues 
in the environment are sufficient to modify participants’ social behaviour. For example, 
participants who have been asked to read a few words related to the stereotype of the 
elderly subsequently walk more slowly down the corridor (Bargh et al., 1996). The effect 
described in this experiment was also produced by a surprisingly subtle manipulation: the 
only difference between the together and back-to-back conditions, for example, was 
whether infants saw the same two dolls facing towards or away from each other in the 
background of otherwise identical photographs. Furthermore, the angle at which the dolls 
were placed meant that infants in these two conditions were exposed to exactly the same 
proportion of the dolls’ faces (that is, they saw the same number of eyes, and same 
proportion of the dolls’ smiles), thus controlling for possible effects of lower-level social 
stimuli on helping behaviour. Thus, the presentation of very subtle cues is sufficient to 
influence social behaviour from early in development.
These results also represent the first demonstration that the connections between 
affiliation and prosocial behaviour are present from early in development. Previous 
research has demonstrated that 18-month-olds are helpful in a range of situations 
(Wameken & Tomasello, 2006) and that 10-month-olds expect individuals to approach 
those who have previously helped them (Hamlin et al., 2007). However, until now, no 
research has investigated the motives underlying helping behaviour in infancy. This
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study goes beyon/l previous research by demonstrating that infants increase their own
tendency to help when cues to affiliation are present.
Furthermore, these data provide an important insight into infants’ understanding 
of affiliative relationships. Infants in this experiment were able to distinguish between 
two dolls facing towards each other and two dolls facing away from each other. Previous
four-year-olds are able to make judgments about affiliation on the basis of physical 
proximity, but not on the basis of more subtle cues such as eye contact (Post & 
Hetherington, 1974, see also Abramovitch & Daly, 1978). Very recent research with 
infants, however, suggests that even 10-month-olds are able to discriminate between 
mutual and averted gaze (Beier & Spelke, 2009). This experiment goes beyond previous 
research in showing that, not only do infants discriminate between very subtle cues such 
as bodily orientation, they associate particular configurations with affiliation and vary 
their social behaviour accordingly.
The paradigm developed in this chapter has far-reaching implications for 
research. As the first successful demonstration of social priming in infants, this work 
provides a novel non-verbal method for developmental psychologists. Social priming in 
adults has been used as a means by which to understand a wide range of social processes 
including, but not limited to, cooperation (Bargh et al., 2001), affiliation (Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003), aggression (Anderson, Benjamin, & Bartholow, 2002), intergroup 
attitudes (Spears, Gordjin, Dijksterhuis, & Stapel, 2004) and prejudice (Bargh et al.,
1996). Currently there is a great deal of interest in the development of inter- and intra­
group cognition and behaviour, with increasing research focus on the developmental
research on older children’s understanding of affiliative relationships has suggested that
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origins of conformity, ingroup bias, and prejudice (e.g., Corriveau & ^ arris, 2009; Fusaro 
& Harris, 2008; Kinzler et al., 2007). The paradigm developed in this paper offers a new 
method through which these and other social processes can be studied in infants.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that these data have intriguing practical 
implications. This experiment has shown the ease with which it is possible to
Idramatically increase prosocial behaviour in infants. Consequently, the data suggest that 
surprisingly subtle changes to our social environment may promote prosocial behaviour 
in our children.
4.3 Suggestions for future research
4.3.1 What is being primed?
The experiment described in this chapter demonstrated that priming affiliation
increases helping behaviour in infants. However, it is not clear from this experiment 
alone exactly what was being primed. Did the primes activate a goal to affiliate or 
something more akin to a concept of affiliation? This ambiguity mirrors a problem in 
priming research more generally, in which it is not always clear which representation (or 
representations) are activated by the priming stimuli. For example, MacCrae and 
Johnson (1998) report that priming helpfulness increases helping behaviour in adults, but 
it is not clear whether the primes activated a goal to be helpful or the concept of 
helpfulness more generally.
Bargh et al. (2001) have, however, provided an empirical distinction between 
conceptual and goal activation in social priming. Building on previous work by Atkinson 
and Birch (1970), Bargh et al. argued that, if a set of social primes activates behavioural 
goals, then the activation associated with them should increase over time until the goal is
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fulfilled. If, on the other hand, the primes activate social concepts, then the activation 
associated with them should either remain constant or decay over time. In order to test 
the nature of the activation associated with their primes, Bargh et al. introduced a delay 
between the priming manipulation and the experimental task. In their experiment, 
participants were primed with words related to achievement and then given a word 
finding task. In one condition, participants worked on this word finding task immediately 
after the priming manipulation and, in the other condition, participants worked on this 
task after a 5 minute delay. Results showed that the influence of the primes was stronger 
after the delay, suggesting that the manipulation had activated a goal to perform well.
In future research, it would be interesting to incorporate a similar manipulation 
into this infant priming paradigm. That is, infants would once again be presented with 
affiliation primes and then participate in a helping task. Critically, however, half of 
infants would participate in the helping task immediately after the presentation of the 
primes, and half would participate in the helping task after a very brief (for example, 30 
second) delay. If the affiliation primes induce a goal to affiliate in infants, then the 
influence of the prime should be stronger after the brief delay.
4.3.2 Would affiliation primes increase social imitation in infancy?
In the previous chapter, I described an experiment in which I tested whether 
inducing a goal to affiliate increases affiliative imitation in 5-year-olds. In that chapter, I 
suggested that it would be interesting to try a similar experiment with younger children, 
but also pointed out that the primes used in that experiment would not be suitable for use 
with infants.
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The priming stimuli described in this chapter coul^, however, be used to test 
whether imitation performs an affiliative function in infancy. If infants’ tendency to 
copy the style with which a model performs an action is influenced by a drive to affiliate, 
then they should be more likely to copy a model’s action style after having been exposed 
to photographs depicting two dolls facing towards each other than after having been 
exposed to photographs depicting two dolls facing away from each other.
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! Chapter 5
General Discussion
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I draw together the theoretical perspective adopted in my General 
Introduction with the results from my three experimental chapters. Following this, I use 
the theoretical ideas and results from this thesis as a basis from which to make 
suggestions for future research. As the specifics of each result have already been 
outlined within the individual chapters, this discussion concentrates on the more general 
themes of the research and broader suggestions for further work.
5.2 Summary of the main findings
In this thesis, I examined three different forms of behaviour matching in 
development. In my General Introduction, I argued that, in adults, social influence in 
general, and behaviour matching in particular, is often motivated by goals to learn from 
and affiliate with others (or by some combination of these two factors). In addition to 
these explicit forms of behaviour matching, however, I pointed out that adults also 
subconsciously assimilate (or match) their behaviour to those around them. Based on an 
analogy to social influence research, I argued that behaviour matching in young children 
may be similarly motivated by goals to learn from and affiliate with others. In other 
words, that imitation serves both an instrumental and a social function in development 
(Uzgiris, 1981, 1984). Further developing the connections with the adult social 
psychology literature, I argued that, in addition to explicit forms of behaviour matching, 
young children and infants may also subconsciously assimilate their behaviour to social
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primes. In the experimental chapters of this thpsis, I investigated questions raised by this 
review. In Chapter 2 ,1 investigated aspects of instrumental imitation. In that chapter, I 
tested whether verbal imitation is based on intention understanding. In Chapter 3 ,1 
investigated the more social aspects of imitation. In particular, I tested whether having an
In Chapter 4 ,1 moved on to discuss unintentional behaviour matching. More specifically, 
I investigated whether even infants assimilate their behaviour to subtle social primes. 
Below I discuss the findings of each chapter and the implications of these results for our 
understanding of behaviour matching in development.
5.2.1 Instrumental behaviour matching
In chapter 2 ,1 investigated instrumental aspects of behaviour matching. In my 
General Introduction, I argued that, although it is broadly accepted that imitation 
performs an instrumental function in development, the specific nature of this skill has 
proved controversial. Whereas some researchers have argued that imitation is based on 
understanding and reproducing the intentions of a model, others have argued that it is 
based predominantly on direct matching or associative learning.
In Chapter 2 ,1 attempted to shed fresh light on this issue by investigating the 
relatively neglected domain of verbal imitation. In that chapter, I tested whether 3-year- 
old children imitate the perceived intentions behind speech rather than the specific 
utterances they hear. In Experiment 1 ,1 replicated previous research showing that 
children correct sentences which include ungrammatical repetitions. In Experiment 2 ,1 
replicated and extended this result, showing that children correct sentences with
affiliation goal increases children’s tendenc to imitate the specific actions of a model.
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ungrammatical repetitions, but repeat sentences with grammatical repetitions exactly. j
Experiment 3 provided the critical test of the intention-based account. In this experiment,
I compared imitation of the same ungrammatical sentences spoken by an intentional 
agent and a non-intentional agent. Children in this experiment corrected the 
ungrammatical sentences of the intentional agent, but repeated the same sentences exactly
I
when they were spoken by the non-intentional agent. i
Taken together, these three experiments provide strong evidence that verbal 
imitation is based on intention-understanding. When combined with previous results 
from the action domain (e.g. Carpenter et al., 1998; Meltzoff, 1995), they also provide 
evidence that imitation more generally is based on intention understanding. Intention- 
based imitation is thus a powerful mechanism for learning how to achieve instrumental 
goals. In the physical domain, intention-based imitation allows children to learn the 
efficient use of tools and cultural artifacts, filtering out mistakes and accidents from the 
demonstrations they observe. Similarly within language, intention-based imitation allows 
children to learn the pragmatics of communication; filtering out mistakes and accidents 
from linguistic demonstrations in order to learn how to efficiently achieve their 
communicative goals.
5.2.2 Social behaviour matching
Whereas Chapter 2 focused on the more instrumental aspects of imitation (how 
children use imitation in order to learn new skills), Chapter 3 concentrated on the more 
social aspects of imitation. In that chapter, I investigated whether children use imitation 
as a means by which to affiliate with those around them.
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Both Carpenter (2006, in pr^ss) and Nielsen (2006, in press) have suggested that 
children’s tendency to copy the specific actions of a model is motivated by affiliation 
goals. Under this conceptualisation, social motivation is taken as a sort of default 
explanation: if children choose not to copy selectively, then their motivation for copying 
must be social rather than instrumental. However, we know from previous research that 
children sometimes copy the specific actions of a model for other reasons. For example, 
in Chapter 2 ,1 reported an experiment in which children copied the specific behaviour of 
a model because they did not believe that model to be an intentional agent. Furthermore, 
some researchers have questioned the theoretical position of Carpenter (2006) and 
Nielsen (2006). Lyons et al. (2007), for example, have argued that children rarely, if 
ever, copy the specific actions of a model for social reasons. According to their 
conceptualisation, children’s tendency to copy the specific actions of a model is produced 
by limitations in their causal understanding (see also Whiten, in press).
In order to test whether children sometimes imitate the specific actions of a model 
in order to fulfil affiliation goals, I presented 5-year-old children with videos in which 
one shape (for example, a blue pentagon) appeared to be excluded from a group of other 
shapes and measured the impact of this prime on their tendency to reproduce the specific 
actions of a model. Results showed that children primed with ostracism reproduced 
significantly more components of the model’s action than children given a neutral prime. 
Presumably they did so because the ostracism prime produced a goal to affiliate. 
Consequently, these data provide strong evidence that imitation serves affiliation goals in 
development.
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5.2.3 Unintentional behaviour matching j
In my General Introduction, I argued that, in addition to explicit forms of 
behaviour matching, adults also show a tendency to subconsciously match their 
behaviour to social primes. The theme of social priming was reintroduced in Chapter 3 
and further investigated in Chapter 4. The experiment I reported in Chapter 4 had two
I
main goals. First, I sought to investigate whether even infants match their behaviour to 
the information presented in social primes. Second, I sought to explore whether 
affiliation information influences infants’ tendency to be helpful.
In order to answer these questions, I presented 18-month-old infants with 
photographs that either primed affiliation (two small dolls standing nex|fb each other in 
the background of other photographs) or individuality (for example, two dolls standing 
back-to-back in the background of otherwise identical photographs) and measured the 
impact on infants’ tendency to be helpful. Results showed that infants primed with 
affiliation were three times as likely to spontaneously help an experimenter as infants 
primed with photographs depicting individuality. These data are the first to demonstrate 
that even infants assimilate their behaviour to social primes. Furthermore, they 
demonstrate that the connections between affiliation and prosocial behaviour are so 
fundamental that they are seen even in infancy.
5.2.4 Conclusion
Taken together, the experiments conducted for this thesis indicate that behaviour 
matching is a diverse and important phenomenon in development. Supporting previous 
research, Chapter 2 shows that imitation is powerful mechanism for learning new skills;
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children do not blindly cppy all aspects of behaviour they observe, rather they copy the 
perceived goals and intentions behind demonstrations. Chapter 3 provides strong 
evidence that imitation performs a social as well as an instrumental function in 
development: children use imitation in order to affiliate with those around them. Chapter 
4 shows just how pervasive behaviour matching is in development: even infants
'I
assimilate their behaviour to subtle social primes.
5.3 Suggestions for future research
In this section, I discuss the broader implications of my experimental work and, 
on that basis, make suggestions for future research. As specific follow-ups to each 
experiment have already been proposed within the individual chapters, this section will 
focus on more general suggestions for further work.
5.3.1 Other forms o f behaviour matching
In this thesis, I have adopted a broad perspective on behaviour matching, 
suggesting that it can be thought of in terms of social influence. I have discussed three 
main forms of social influence and behaviour matching in development: instrumental 
imitation, social imitation and social priming. Within adult social psychology, however, 
the field of social influence includes a wide range of other processes, including 
persuasion, compliance, conformity, obedience, group polarisation and minority 
influence (see Turner, 1991). Conformity, compliance and persuasion are particularly 
interesting within the current context, because they each contain an imitative component. 
In conformity, the individual matches the opinions of their group members. In
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compliance, the individual matches the behaviour of their group members, bjat does not 
internalise the opinions which underlie them. In persuasion, the individual (sometimes) 
adopts the perceived attitudes of another.
Developmental research suggests that young children also engage in some of 
these forms of behaviour matching. Corriveau and Harris (2009), for example,
Iinvestigated the extent of conformity in 3- and 4-year-olds by testing them within a 
modified version of the Asch paradigm. Corriveau and Harris presented children with a 
video in which three individuals offered a unanimously incorrect judgement on the 
relative length of three lines. When asked to judge the relative length of similar lines 
themselves, children conformed to the majority’s opinion on approximately one third of 
trials (see also Walker & Andrade, 1996).
Despite increasing interest in group processes such as conformity and compliance 
in development, there have thus far been no attempts to empirically combine research on 
imitation with research on these other forms of behaviour matching. In future research, it 
would be interesting to investigate the developmental connections between instrumental 
imitation, social imitation, conformity, compliance and persuasion. Longitudinal 
research could investigate when each of these different forms of behaviour matching first 
emerge in development and whether there are systematic individual differences in the 
tendency to engage in some forms of behaviour matching over others.
5.3.2 The effects of being imitated
In this thesis, I have thus far discussed (and conducted) research on children’s 
tendency to match the behaviour of those around them. Within real-world settings,
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however, imitation takes place within ongoing social interaction, with many opportunities 
for a social partner to imitate the child as well as the other way round. In future research, 
it would be interesting to investigate the impact of being imitated on young children’s 
behaviour.
Previous research in adults has shown that being imitated increases rapport
(
between individuals. Chartrand and Bargh (1999), for example, demonstrated that 
participants who have had their mannerisms mimicked by a confederate subsequently 
report liking the confederate more than participants who have not been mimicked by the 
confederate. Subsequent research has demonstrated that being imitated also influences 
adults’ behaviour. Participants who have had their mannerisms mimicked by a social 
partner are subsequently more helpful (van Baaren et al., 2004) and more generous (van 
Baaren, 2005) than participants who have not had their mannerisms mimicked. Thus, 
imitation has been conceptualised as a form of ‘social glue’ which facilitates bonds 
between individuals (Lakin et al., 2003).
Developmental work has suggested that infants are also able to discriminate 
between an individual who imitates and an individual who does not imitate them. 
Meltzoff (1990) found that 14-month-old infants prefer to look at an imitator over a 
nonimitator. Very recent work has suggested that being imitated may also influence 
behaviour in infancy. Carpenter, Uebel and Tomasello (2009) engaged 18-month-old 
infants in a brief interaction during which an experimenter either imitated their actions or 
not. Subsequent to this, the experimenter briefly left the room and returned with a small 
bundle of sticks which she ‘accidentally’ dropped on the floor. Although there were no 
differences between conditions in the number of infants who helped the experimenter (by
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picking up the sticks and offering them to her), infants who had previously been imitated 
were significantly faster to offer their help than infants who had not been imitated.
In future research, it would be interesting to further investigate the influence of 
being imitated on young children’s behaviour. One important question is whether 
imitation has universally positive consequences for social interaction, as suggested by the 
‘social glue’ hypothesis. One possibility is that, although imitation increases liking and 
rapport, it decreases perceived competence and expertise. From a theoretical perspective 
this seems plausible because, under many circumstances, an imitator cannot be 
considered an independent source of information; their opinions and behaviour reflect the 
decisions of those around them rather than their own experience. Consequently, when 
presented with a choice to learn from an imitator or from an individual who makes 
independent decisions, children may choose to learn from the independent source. I have 
recently conducted an experiment which supports this novel hypothesis. In this 
experiment, 4-year-old children were more likely to believe an implausible fact (that a 
particular type of fish lived in trees) if it was told to them by an individual who had 
previously made independent choices than if it was told to them by an individual who had 
previously imitated them. In an ongoing follow-up to this experiment, I am investigating 
whether children choose to adopt the preferences of an imitator, but the novel object 
labels of an independent source.
5.3.3 Intergroup cognition and behaviour in early development
Thus far, the vast majority of the research I have discussed has investigated how 
young children and infants identify with others dyadically; in imitative interactions with a
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sir/gle model. As adults, however, we do not merely identify with others as particular 
individuals, we identify with them as members of particular groups (Turner, 1991). 
Although intergroup cognition and behaviour is a huge field in social psychology, we 
know very little about young children’s identification with the group. Research using 
verbal methods has suggested that ingroup bias and outgroup prejudice, for example, are 
mot present until around 5 years of age (Aboud, 1988, 2003). However, more recent 
research has suggested that the origins of group identification can be seen even in 
infancy. Kinzler et al. (2007), for example, found that infants prefer to look at and accept 
toys from native language speakers over foreign language speakers. In future research, it 
would be interesting to further investigate the origins of intergroup cognition and 
behaviour in development. Below I outline a number of suggestions for empirical 
research which could shed light on this topic.
Do young children identify with ingroup members more than outgroup members?
Previous research has shown that young children are sensitive to some correlates 
of group membership, for example, the languages different individuals speak (Kinzler et 
al., 2007). However, we do not yet know whether young children merely prefer what is 
familiar to them (see Zajonc, 1968) or whether they truly identify with their group 
members. In future research, it will be important to investigate group identification in 
young children more directly.
One means by which to do this would be to adapt the Sticker Test, a task 
originally designed to test self-other identification in children with autism (Hobson & 
Meyer, 2005), for use within an intergroup context. In this task, an experimenter engages
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children in a game with stickers. After giving the chilli a sticker for themselves, the 
experimenter holds up a second sticker and says to the child ‘This sticker is for me to 
wear, where should I put it?’ The task is based on the assumption that, if children 
identify with the experimenter, then they will indicate a location on their own body in 
response to this question. If children have problems identifying with the experimenter (or
I
choose not to identify with them), on the other hand, then they will point directly to a 
location on the experimenter’s body.
In future research, it would be possible to manipulate whether the experimenter in 
this task is an ingroup or an outgroup member. If children identify with ingroup 
members more strongly than outgroup members, then they should point to locations on 
their own body when playing the game with an ingroup member, but to locations on the 
experimenter’s body when playing the game with an outgroup member.
Do young children imitate ingroup members and outgroup members differently?
Another important question for future research is whether young children’s 
identification with the group influences their imitation. For example, it would be 
interesting to know whether young children choose to closely imitate the actions of an 
ingroup member, but distance their behaviour from that of an outgroup member. 
Following on from this basic question, it would be interesting to investigate whether 
group membership influences what children learn from a demonstration (as well as what 
they choose to imitate). For example, to test whether young children retain information 
taught to them by ingroup members for longer intervals than information taught to them 
by outgroup members. Experiments such as these would have important implications for
124
our understanding of how children’s identification with the group impacts upon the 
formation and maintenance of culturally specific traditions (see Tomasello, 1999; 
Tomasello et al., 2005).
Does priming group membership influence young children’s tendency to imitate an 
outgroup member?
Another important priority for future research will be to investigate the conditions 
under which young children are prepared to imitate an outgroup member. As adults, our 
understanding of group membership is flexible: a particular individual may be viewed as 
an ingroup member in one context and an outgroup member in another context. 
Furthermore, whereas under some circumstances we are accepting of, and even friendly 
towards outgroup members, under other circumstances we are indifferent and even 
hostile towards them. Previous research has demonstrated that infants are sensitive to 
some correlates of group membership (Kinzler et al., 2007), however, we do not yet 
know whether infants show any flexibility in their behaviour towards outgroup members. 
In future research, it would be interesting to use social priming in order to investigate 
whether the group context influences young children’s tendency to imitate an outgroup 
member. If children are flexible in their behaviour towards outgroup members, then they 
should be less likely to imitate an outgroup member when primed with an intergroup 
comparison than when primed with group integration (see Haslam, Turner, Oakes, 
McGarty, & Hayes, 1992, for a related study with adults). Such an experiment would 
have important theoretical implications, suggesting that infants’ behaviour towards 
outgroup members is not purely determined by the nature of the external stimulus.
I
Furthermore, it would have important practical implications, suggesting that subtle cues 
to group integration may increase children’s tolerance for those perceived to be different 
from themselves.
5.4 Conclusion ,
I
This thesis investigated the nature of behaviour matching in development. My 
experimental work has demonstrated that children use imitation both as a means by 
which to learn from and affiliate with those around them. Furthermore, it has 
demonstrated that behaviour matching in development occurs both intentionally, as when 
children choose to imitate the instrumental actions of a model, and unintentionally, as 
when children assimilate their behaviour to subtle social primes. Thus, behaviour 
matching is a diverse and important phenomenon in development. In this General 
Discussion, I have argued that these results have important implications for future 
research. I have suggested that it will be important for future research to adopt an even 
broader perspective on behaviour matching, and investigate the developmental 
connections between imitation and other forms of behaviour matching such as 
conformity, compliance and persuasion. Furthermore, I have argued that future research 
should move beyond investigation of children’s identification and affiliation with other 
individuals and explore children’s identification with the group. Based on the methods 
developed in this thesis, I have suggested a series of experiments which could help to 
address these important issues in future work.
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